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W O R L D  P E A C E  A N D  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y :
A D D R E S S I N G  U . N . S E C U R I T Y  C O U N C I L  
R E S O L U T I O N  1 3 2 5 ’ S  W E A K N E S S E S
lizabeth riffiths,* ara arman,** and ric albot ensen***
Abstract
The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the pas-
sage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”)
1325, the most important moment in the United Nations’ efforts 
to achieve world peace through gender equality. Over the past 
several decades, the international community has strengthened its 
focus on gender, including the relationship between gender and 
international peace and security. National governments and the 
United Nations have taken historic steps to elevate the role of 
women in governance and peacebuilding. The passage of 
UNSCR 1325 in 2000 foreshadowed what many hoped would 
be a transformational shift in international law and politics. 
However, the promise of gender equality has gone largely unreal-
ized, despite the uncontroverted connection between treatment of 
women and the peacefulness of a nation.
This Article argues for the first time that to achieve interna-
tional peace and security through gender equality, the United 
Nations Security Council should transition its approach from 
making recommendations and suggestions to issuing mandatory 
requirements under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. If the Se-
curity Council and the international community believe gender 
equality is the best indicator of sustainable peace, then the Secu-
rity Council could make a finding under Article 39 with respect 
to ‘a threat to the peace’—States who continue to mistreat wom-
en and girls pose a threat to international peace and security.
* BA, Sociology, Brigham Young University.
** JD, Brigham Young University Law School.
*** Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. The authors would like to 
thank the faculties of Emory Law School and SMU Dedman School of Law who 
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Summer Crockett and Kyra Waring provided excellent research and review assis-
tance.
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Such a finding would trigger the Security Council’s mandatory 
authority to direct States to take specific actions. In exercising its 
mandatory authority, the Security Council should organize, sup-
port, and train grassroots organizations and require States to do 
the same. It should further require States to produce a reviewable 
National Action Plan, detailing how each State will implement 
its responsibilities to achieve gender equality. The Security Coun-
cil should also provide culturally sensitive oversight on domestic 
laws which may act as a restraint on true gender equality.
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I. Introduction
“No country can get ahead if it leaves half of its people behind . . . gender 
equality is critical to our shared goals of prosperity, stability, and peace.”1
The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the passage of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1325,2 the 
single most important document in international law with respect to 
gender equality. Over the past two decades, the international communi-
ty has embraced the growing evidence that women are vital in maintain-
ing international peace and security.3 The abundance of evidence col-
lected by U.N. women’s organizations and academic studies makes clear 
that a nation’s treatment of women has a direct correlation to that na-
1. John Kerry, Opinion, Why Women are Central to U.S. Foreign Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, Mar. 8, 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/03/
207940.htm [https://perma.cc/GVZ8-9WAP].
2. S.C. Res. 1325, (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter UNSCR 1325].
3. Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls, U.N.:
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
gender-equality/ [https://perma.cc/K5JL-EAJM] (“Gender equality is not only a fun-
damental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sus-
tainable world.”).
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tion’s overall peacefulness, both internally and externally.4 As Valerie 
Hudson,5 a lead researcher in this field, explained:
[T]he very best predictor6 of a state’s peacefulness is not its 
level of wealth, its level of democracy, or its ethno-religious 
4. For example, “[w]omen’s direct participation in peace negotiations increases the sus-
tainability and the quality of peace. A study investigating 82 peace agreements in 42 
armed conflicts between 1989 and 2011 found that peace agreements with women 
signatories are associated with durable peace.” Facts and Figures: Peace and Security,
U.N. WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/facts-
and-figures [https://perma.cc/GC7R-UW59]. Further, “[t]he larger the gender gap, 
the more likely [for a nation-state] to be involved in inter- and intra-state conflict, 
and to use violence first in a conflict.” Valerie M. Hudson & Chad Emmett, Sex and 
World Peace, WOODROW WILSON CTR. (Apr. 2012), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/event/Hudson%20Presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6RN-FGNV]. But see Catherine Powell, How Women Could 
Save the World, If Only We Would Let Them: From Gender Essentialism to Inclusive Se-
curity, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 271, 272 (2017), where the author argues that 
“while some evidence supports these claims, the statistical evidence supporting these 
claims suffers from methodological flaws.” The author goes on to argue that typecast-
ing women as more peaceful than men denies the fact that “at least some women can 
be as militaristic and hawkish as men” and denies women their “agency and self-
expression.” Id. at 275.
5. Hudson is ranked ninety-seventh in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Thinkers of 2009. Re-
becca Frankel, The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 25, 2009), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/25/the-fp-top-100-global-thinkers-7/
[https://perma.cc/Y4J2-VBKD].
6. Hudson’s research is too extensive to thoroughly reproduce and analyze here, but it is 
sufficient to note that several of the key indicators of a state’s peacefulness explored in 
her research are the physical security of women; domestic laws on family law topics 
such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance; and a male gender imbalance, meaning a 
disproportionate male population based on factors such as female infanticide. These 
factors, and many others, build a statistical database that allows Hudson to draw her 
conclusions. She states:
On our scale measuring the physical security of women [with 0 being the 
best and 4 being the worst], no country in the world received a 0. Not 
one. The world average is 3.04, attesting to the widespread and persistent 
violence perpetrated against women worldwide, even among the most 
developed and freest countries.
Valerie M. Hudson, What Sex Means for World Peace, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 24, 
2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/24/what-sex-means-for-world-peace/
[https://perma.cc/6SZV-8BRJ]. She argues further:
In family law, women are disadvantaged in areas such as marriage, di-
vorce, and inheritance. This inequity in turn serves as a foundation for 
violence against women, while also undercutting their ability to fend for 
themselves and their children. My colleagues and I found that the world’s
average score for inequity in family law is 2.06, indicating that most 
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identity; the best predictor of a state’s peacefulness is how 
well its women are treated. What’s more, democracies with 
higher levels of violence against women are as insecure and 
unstable as nondemocracies.7
Matthew Rycroft, the United Kingdom’s permanent representative to 
the U.N. during the Balkan peace talks, argued that having women at 
the peace table is vital to creating lasting security in Syria. He said, “[a]s 
diplomats in the Balkans two decades ago, we watched as the failure to 
include women in peace negotiations contributed to a divisive, paralyz-
ing political settlement.”8 The U.N. Secretary-General added in 2005, 
that “there is no tool for development more effective than the empow-
erment of women . . . And I would venture that no policy is more im-
portant in preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a con-
flict has ended.”9 President Obama commented that “[y]ou can gauge 
the success of a society by how it treats its women.”10
Recognizing this phenomenon and its effect on international peace 
and security, the United Nations Security Council has sought to im-
prove the treatment of women worldwide by improving the internation-
countries have laws that discriminate to a greater or lesser degree against 
women.
Id. She concludes that “[u]nless we consciously and swiftly empower women to exer-
cise their full rights of self-determination, as social, political and economic actors, we 
cannot expect to duck the demographic blow back that we have currently set in mo-
tion.” Valerie M. Hudson, Women and the Demography-Security Nexus, WORLD POL.
REV. (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12511/women-
and-the-demography-security-nexus [https://perma.cc/MQK2-6GB4] [hereinafter 
Women and the Demography-Security Nexus].
7. Hudson, What Sex Means for World Peace, supra note 6.
8. Matthew Rycroft & Swanee Hunt, Want Peace in Syria? Put Women at the Negotiat-
ing Table, DEF. ONE (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/01
/want-peace-syria-put-women-negotiating-table/125536/ [https://perma.cc/Z672-
Q443].
9. Press Release, Empowerment of Women the Most Effective Development Tool, Sec-
retary-General Tells Commission on Status of Women, U.N. Press Release SG/SM
/9738-WOM/1489 (Feb. 28, 2005), https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm
9738.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/2EDB-Z8CP] (quoted in BRENDA FITZPATRICK,
TACTICAL RAPE IN WAR AND CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND 
RESPONSE 221 (2016)).
10. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
[https://perma.cc/LF8X-C5R7].
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al legal system.11 But have these efforts been enough? In recent remarks 
to the Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General stated:
[Despite the fact that the] women, peace, and security agenda 
is clearly one of the top priorities of the United Nations as a 
whole . . . the commitment that is always reflected [by the 
Security Council] is not translating into real change around 
the world. It is not coming fast enough or far enough. 
Change is coming at a pace that is too slow for the women 
and girls whose lives depend on it, and for the effectiveness of 
our efforts to maintain international peace and security.12
At least some responsibility for the limited success can be attributed 
to the fact that initiatives towards gender equality have not been fully 
embraced by States. Often the international efforts have been central-
ized or external to the State, inhibiting support for, and recognition of, 
these efforts within existing local structures, such as grassroots move-
ments. These local structures are key to providing greater context and 
cultural awareness about these efforts within States. Additionally, the 
lack of adaptable top-down13 approaches, such as a universal implemen-
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls on United Nations, 
Regional Organizations to Bolster Role of Women in Peacekeeping, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 2538, U.N. Press Release SC/14288 (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14288.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/2DXN-
SKQC]; see also KRISTINA MADER ET AL., MAPPING WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 
IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: 2019 (2020); Security Council Open Debate on 
Women, Peace and Security, UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING, https://www.un.org
/peacebuilding/news/security-council-open-debate-women-peace-and-security 
[https://perma.cc/B5GY-ZU5B]; Women, Peace, and Security in the Work of the U.N.
Security Council, U.N. WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-
and-security/un-security-council [https://perma.cc/K336-DX5A].
12. Press Release, Pledges on Women’s Rights Have Not Translated into Real Change 
Nearly 20 Years after Resolution 1325 (2000), Secretary-General Tells Security 
Council, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/19834-SC/14000-WOM/2198 at ¶ 2-3 (Oct. 
29, 2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19834.doc.htm [https://perma.cc
/Y833-VFHZ].
13. A top-down approach starts with international or domestic government implementa-
tion of support for protection and empowerment of individuals whereas a bottom-up 
approach starts with individuals and communities who act on their own behalf in 
creating solutions. Such an approach, for example, has been used in Nepal. See Nitya 
Chanana & Shehnab Sahim, A Top-Down Approach for Gender Empowerment in Ne-
pal, CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRIC. & FOOD SEC.: CGIAR (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://ccafs.cgiar.org/news/top-down-approach-gender-empowerment-
nepal#.X1V9LXlKjOi [https://perma.cc/DAN8-RZH7]. The project has had mixed 
results. See Prachi Patel, In Nepal, Despite Political Empowerment, Women Find Lim-
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tation of effective National Action Plans (“NAPs”), continues to inhibit 
equal treatment of women at the national level. This hinders a State’s 
ability to fully contribute to the development of international peace and 
security.
However, this Article argues that the single most important factor 
contributing to the failure of prior efforts is the lack of authoritative ac-
tion or enforcement by the Security Council. As the international com-
munity recognizes the value of the equal treatment of women and girls, 
international law becomes responsible for fostering international peace 
and security by addressing the fundamental and widespread disparities 
that continue to prevent many of the world’s women from taking their 
rightful places in their communities and governments.
This Article proposes that the Security Council exercise its Chapter 
VII authority with respect to the equal treatment of women. The previ-
ous twenty years of U.N. initiatives without Chapter VII authority have 
been ineffective in forcing global change; it is now time to change the 
approach. By making clear the connection between international peace 
and security and the equal treatment of women, the Security Council 
has placed this initiative squarely within its Chapter VII authority. For 
the required refocus of international law on gender equality to fully real-
ize its potential impact on increasing international peace and security, 
the Security Council must invoke Chapter VII authority when mandat-
ing key steps to achieve gender equality. These steps could begin with 
the Security Council mandating general state level support of grassroots 
organizations, the creation of a NAP template by the U.N. with the in-
put of civil society, the universal requirement that Member States im-
plement an effective NAP based on the template, or a robust review and 
correction of domestic laws that allow and reinforce gender inequality in 
areas such as inheritance, property ownership, business, and domestic 
violence.
Part II of this Article describes how the international community in 
general, the Security Council, and other U.N. organs and agencies, have 
used data correlating the treatment of women and the overall peaceful-
ness of a nation to embark on an aggressive attempt to use gender equal-
ity to achieve international peace and security. Part III concludes that 
these international efforts have been mostly ineffective.
ited Opportunities to Shape Water Policy, INT’L WATER MGMT. INST.: BLOG 
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/2020/03/in-nepal-despite-political-
empowerment-women-find-limited-opportunities-to-shape-water-policy/ [https://
perma.cc/37NF-CSME]. However, the top-down aspects of this are generally recog-
nized as successful and it is other factors, such as systematic barriers to employment 
and education, that are inhibiting the effectiveness of the initiatives. Id.
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Part IV of the Article argues that the Security Council can dramati-
cally increase the effectiveness of this prior work by invoking Chapter 
VII. If the international community really believes gender equality im-
pacts international peace and security, the proper procedure requires the 
use of the Security Council’s Chapter VII mandatory authority. Part IV 
further outlines a number of specific actions that the Security Council 
could mandate, all of which would represent progress in this area.
If a State’s treatment of women predicts its stability as the statistics 
suggest, the changes proposed in this Article will present the interna-
tional community with a chance to take a meaningful step forward.14
These changes will not only better the lives of billions of women and 
girls across the world, but also increase international peace and security 
through gender equality.
II. UNSCR 1325
“Resolution 1325 . . . was one of the most inspired decisions of the United 
Nations Security Council. The recognition that peace is inextricably linked 
with gender equality and women’s leadership was a radical step for the high-
est body tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security.”15
UNSCR 1325 was the first major international recognition that a 
nation’s treatment of its women affects national and global peace and 
security. Described as “the international body’s first full-fledged atten-
tion to gendered aspects of peace and conflict” and “one of the most 
crucial U.N. resolutions on peace and security,”16 UNSCR 1325 was a 
milestone17 in the struggle for gender equality and solidified the link be-
14. VALERIE M. HUDSON, BONNIE BALLIF-SPANVILL, MARY CAPRIOLI & CHAD F.
EMMETT, SEX AND WORLD PEACE 95-118 (2012).
15. RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, U.N. WOMEN, PREVENTING CONFLICT,
TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE 5 (2015), https://wps.unwomen.org/
pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HJA-QBUJ].
16. GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND UNSC RESOLUTION 1325 4 (Seema Shekhawat 
ed., 2018).
17. For example, in 2015 the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security 
(“WPS”) reported:
New research shows the increasing presence of references to women and 
gender perspectives in peace agreements, in particular after the adoption 
of resolution 1325 (2000). An analysis of 664 agreements produced be-
tween 1990 and 2000 showed that 73 (11 per cent) included at least one 
reference to women. An analysis of 504 agreements reached in the period 
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tween the national status of women and international peace and securi-
ty. Fifteen years after the creation of UNSCR 1325, Executive Director 
of U.N. Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka stated that “the recogni-
tion that peace is inextricably linked with gender equality and women’s 
leadership was a radical step for the highest body tasked with the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”18 As revolutionary as 
it was, UNSCR 1325 built on an important history of U.N.-adopted 
resolutions and policies that paved the way for women-focused peace 
and security initiatives.
A. Pre-UNSCR 1325 Efforts
Even before the passage of UNSCR 1325, the international com-
munity was aware of global gender inequality and was committed to ad-
dressing it through cooperative international efforts. These landmark 
actions included ratifying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), convening the 1985 Women’s Conference, the passage of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”), assembling the Beijing Conference, and 
creating the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). These actions in-
formed the development and passage of UNSCR 1325 as well as the 
post-UNSCR 1325 assessment reports19 following its ratification.20
This section provides a brief chronological overview of prior Wom-
en, Peace, and Security (“WPS”) initiatives and successes and highlights 
the significant gaps remaining between international WPS policymaking 
after the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) until 1 January 2015 
showed that 138 (27 per cent) included references to women.
U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/2015/716 (Sept. 16, 2015). http://www.security
councilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D
/s_2015_716.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UMH-RNW9].
18. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 5.
19. In UNSCR 1325, the Security Council tasked the Secretary-General with carrying
out a study on the “impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women 
in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolu-
tion.” UNSCR 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 16. These assessments provide comprehensive 
findings and analysis and set out key recommendations. See infra Section II.C.2.
20. For the complete database of all reports on Women, Peace and Security, see general-
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and implementation. This Article will demonstrate that these shortcom-
ings in implementation are due to the lack of mandatory adoption of 
and compliance with WPS resolutions. Part IV argues that WPS pro-
gress will remain piecemeal at best until these initiatives are enforced by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII.
1. Early Human Rights Documents
Contemporary efforts aimed at achieving women’s equality have 
their foundation in the post-World War II recognition of certain enu-
merated human rights first articulated in the UDHR.21 While this 
might have been an appropriate beginning for achieving gender equali-
ty, the UDHR minimizes the role of women in maintaining interna-
tional peace.22 The U.N.’s westernized viewpoint prioritizes principles of 
state sovereignty and non-interference rather than human security.23
Since gender equality blankets women’s equal rights and is a category of 
human security, this viewpoint has led to a slow recognition of women’s 
roles in maintaining peace and security.24 Still, despite the lack of explic-
it language concerning gender equality, many believe that the UDHR 
was the first real step toward women’s involvement in peace and security 
initiatives.25
The UDHR expressed certain aspects of humanity as inalienable 
rights and opened pathways to preserve rights in the future.26 It men-
21. UDHR Article 2 states: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 
10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
22. SANAM NARAGHI ANDERLINI, WOMEN BUILDING PEACE: WHAT THEY DO, WHY IT 
MATTERS 191-93 (2007).
23. While noting the importance of human security, the General Assembly emphasizes 
supreme respect for state sovereignty. For example, the resolution “[u]rges all States 
to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the 
sovereign right of peoples to determine their political, economic and social system.”
G.A. Res. 47/130, ¶ 5 (Feb. 22, 1993).
24. Furthermore, the westernized concept of sovereignty, beginning with the Peace of 
Westphalia peace treaties in 1648, widely established what is now a prevailing but not 
globally accepted order among states. Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 
1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST. REV. 569-91 (1999).
25. ANDERLINI, supra note 22, at 193.
26. Veronica Fynn Bruey, Redefining Women’s Roles in International and Regional Law in
GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 21, 26-28
(Seema Shekhawat ed., 2018).
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tions gender only once, stating in Article 2 that “everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.”27 This general statement identifies gender merely as a basis for non-
discrimination.28 The freedoms and rights expressed in this declara-
tion—including the rights to equal pay for equal work, education, 
health, and participation and influence in the development of society—
formed a foundation regarding the relationship between human security 
and gender.29 This language has been widely adopted, particularly in 
subsequent international human rights treaties,30 ensuring the applica-
bility of these principles to women.
Following the adoption of the UDHR, non-traditional threats to 
international peace and security, such as HIV/AIDS, were gradually 
recognized as serious because of their ties to human security.31 The 
UDHR’s focus on human rights initiated the transition within the in-
ternational community to a recognition that human security was a sig-
nificant aspect of the greater concept of international peace and securi-
ty.32 This shift also included a greater focus on examining human securi-
security-related practices within States, such as a proscription on torture 
and ensuring individual rights upon arrest.33 This view eventually al-
lowed the umbrella of peace and security to expand to include human 
security or any “challenges pertaining to survival, livelihood, and dignity 
of people” as defined by the General Assembly Resolution 66/290.34
This vital shift proved essential for the development of future docu-
ments addressing the important relationship between women and secu-
rity, though the UDHR did not itself include such foresight.
27. UDHR, supra note 21, ¶ 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
incorporates similar language, calling for “[f]air wages and equal remuneration for 
work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guar-
anteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for 
equal work.” G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7 §(a)(i) (Dec. 16, 1966).
31. Des Gasper & Thanh-Dam Truong, Deepening Development Ethics: From Economism
to Human Development to Human Security, 17 EUR. J. DEV. RSCH. 372, 373-84
(2005).
32. Id.
33. UDHR, supra note 21, at art. 5.
34. The United Nations General Assembly defines human security as “an approach to 
assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting chal-
lenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.” G.A. Res. 66/290, ¶ 3
(Oct. 25, 2012); see also Gasper & Truong, supra note 31, at 372-84.
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Building directly on the UDHR, two important human rights 
documents followed in 1966: The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)35 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).36 Both agreements 
took specific language from the UDHR and created legally binding and 
widely ratified international agreements.37 An in-depth analysis of these 
three international human rights documents is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but it is important to note that while the agreements did not 
specifically codify a right to gender equality, they have provided the ba-
sis for almost all subsequent work in the WPS area.
2. Human Security
As mentioned above, the international shift to human security was 
an important, worldwide trend that greatly impacted the global wom-
en’s movement. Near the end of the Cold War, international commit-
tees began to view threats unrelated to armed conflict, such as the HIV
/AIDS epidemic and environmental degradation, as substantial disrupt-
ers to international security.38 This new discourse was a paradigmatic 
shift away from the traditional state- and military-oriented notions of 
security, that of security being assessed as the presence or not of an 
35. Article 3 of the ICCPR states that “the States Parties to the present Covenant under-
take to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and 
political rights set forth in the present Covenant.” United Nations International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [herein-
after ICCPR].
36. The ICESCR focuses on protection of economic, social, and cultural human rights. It 
specifies the equal right of men and women to these rights and prohibits gender-
based discrimination. United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
37. Compare ICCPR, supra note 35, at articles 6-8, with UDHR, supra note 21, at arti-
cles 3-5. Compare ICESCR, supra note 36, at articles 6-11 with UDHR, supra note 
21, at articles 22-23, 25. The ICCPR has been ratified by 173 countries. Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg
_no=IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/24LC-8RSF]. The ICESCR has been ratified 
by 171 countries. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en)
[https://perma.cc/Y6PR-ABQS].
38. Francis Deng, Human Security and the Global Challenge of Internal Displacement,
BROOKINGS (May 11, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/human-
security-and-the-global-challenge-of-internal-displacement/ [https://perma.cc
/5UVD-9UQ9].
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armed conflict, to a more people-centric vision with emphasis on the in-
ternal workings of the state.39 For example, South Sudan ambassador 
Francis Deng40 stated:
[Human security] provides the umbrella for the stipulation of 
sovereignty as responsibility under the watchful eye of the in-
ternational community to hold states accountable and offer 
them a helping hand in ensuring the physical, psychological, 
moral and material well-being of all those under their juris-
diction. It also provides an appropriate framework for bring-
ing non-state actors into parameters of accountability.41
Scholar C. de Jonge Oudraat argues that this shift to a human-centered 
view of security was an essential prerequisite of the creation of UNSCR 
1325 and the progression of the global women’s movement.42 This shift 
was the first time that gender equality was tied to international peace 
and security by way of human security.
Discussing the human security framework for gender issues and 
women’s rights, gender issues scholar Natalie Florea Hudson states:
39. Canadian academic and public servant Lloyd Axworthy explains:
In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and 
non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by 
freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even 
their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps 
best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative 
way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather 
than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments. Like 
other security concepts—national security, economic security, food secu-
rity—it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive 
measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial 
action where prevention fails.
Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, CAN. DEP’T.
OF FOREIGN AFFS. & INT’L TRADE Part 3 (1999), http://www.summit-americas.org
/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm [https://perma.cc/E5HU-2UZH].
40. See Secretary-General Appoints Francis Deng of Sudan as Special Advisor for Prevention 
of Genocide, Mass Atrocities, UNITED NATIONS (May 29, 2007), https://www.un.org/
press/en/2007/sga1070.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/G9FP-ST8N] (Francis Deng 
served as a politician and diplomat of South Sudan and was the country’s first ambas-
sador to the United Nations from 2012 to 2016).
41. Deng, supra note 38.
42. Unfortunately, this shift was “eclipsed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
when international attention became consumed by military responses to counter ter-
rorism in Afghanistan and Iraq” and took focus away from the women’s movement. 
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, UNSCR 1325—Conundrums and Opportunities, 39 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 612 (2013).
260 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 27:247
[The framework] operates from the premise that women’s 
rights and gender equality situated in a human rights frame 
or even a moral frame are not enough and simply not as ef-
fective in generating awareness, response, and commitment.
Therefore, the framework highlights how protecting and 
promoting the rights of women is a fundamental component 
of international peace and security—the driving mission of 
the U.N. The idea is that security needs women, as much as 
women need security. The security language serves as a 
framework for action through discursive positioning that sit-
uates women as central, or at least part of, the security agen-
da. The frame highlights how women’s rights and gender 
equality can contribute to international peace and security, 
and therefore constitute vested interest for many national and 
international leaders.43
Tying the international peace and security agenda to women’s security 
and gender treatment issues, while differentiating it from the traditional 
armed conflict issues that previously pervaded discussions on interna-
tional peace and security, elevates the importance of human security to a 
global level. As Hudson concludes, “[w]ith this framework, targeting the 
U.N. Security Council became critical.”44 And as this Article argues,45
targeting the legally binding authority given to the Security Council 
with respect to international peace and security is the next step in the 
continual progression of achieving gender equality.
3. CEDAW and Its Optional Protocol
The U.N. General Assembly declared 1975 as International Wom-
en’s Year and the following ten years (1976-1985) were declared the 
United Nations Decade for Women.46 These two declarations empha-
sized women’s issues and this new emphasis represented a turning point 
for the international community. These initiatives were focused on 
evaluating the status and rights of women and promoting the incorpora-
43. NATALIE FLOREA HUDSON, GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
SECURITY LANGUAGE AS A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WOMEN 1, 9 (2009) [herein-
after GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS].
44. Id.
45. See infra Part V.
46. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN
1945-1996 80 (1996).
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tion of women into decision-making bodies at all levels of society. The 
United Nations Decade for Women culminated in the adoption of 
CEDAW,47 a treaty which aimed to achieve equality between women 
and men.48
CEDAW was developed to protect women’s rights and prevent 
gender discrimination.49 CEDAW consists of thirty articles, with the 
first sixteen defining the rights of women.50 This convention built upon 
the human-centric foundation of the UDHR, while also addressing 
women specifically for the first time.51 International security and politi-
cal science scholars Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary 
Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, reflecting on the value of CEDAW,
stated, “It has been noted that unless a right is said to expressly belong 
to women, it may not in fact be assumed to do so. CEDAW endeavors 
to be a bill of human rights for all women across the globe.”52
The language of the treaty urges Member States to eliminate dis-
crimination against women throughout political, public, and economic 
sectors.53 The treaty places the responsibility of achieving gender equali-
47. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. CEDAW has been ratified 
by 189 countries, but the United Sates has not ratified it. Eighty of those nations 
have made reservations or declarations concerning their ratification. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en#4 [https://perma.cc/2PDM-W4EC] .
48. CEDAW, supra note 47, at art. 15.
49. Id. at Preamble.
50. Id. at art. 1–16.
51. For example, the UDHR only mentions women’s rights twice, once in the preamble 
and once in article 16, but in both cases there is no specific distinction for rights of 
women. They are mentioned in conjunction with rights of men. See generally 
UDHR, supra note 21. In contrast, CEDAW deals specifically with rights for wom-
en, without tying them to similar rights for men. See generally CEDAW, supra note 
47.
52. Hudson, et al. further explains:
Each state party is asked to present a report every four years that docu-
ments what actions the government is taking to implement CEDAW, 
and in what areas progress still needs to be made. These state reports are 
reviewed by the CEDAW Committee, which issues observations about 
the truthfulness and rigor of the state reports. Indeed, the committee also 
welcomes the submission of “shadow CEDAWs,” CEDAW reports writ-
ten by nongovernmental organizations within the nation . . . .
HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 123-24.
53. For example, Article 3 states:
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ty on domestic governments.54 Along with promoting women’s rights 
throughout all levels of government, the treaty encourages the “recogni-
tion of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbring-
ing and development of their children” to eliminate stereotypical behav-
ior perpetuating gender inequality at the civil society level.55
Unfortunately, not all Member States have embraced this vision. 
Although 189 States have ratified CEDAW, Member States have lim-
ited the original reach and intent of this document through the use of 
reservations.56 Articles 2 and 16, which address marriage and family 
planning, birth control, sexuality, and reproductive health, have been 
especially debated among Member States.57 Some sixty Member States 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, so-
cial, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, includ-
ing legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of 
women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and en-
joyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men.
           CEDAW, supra note 47, at art. 3.
54. HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14.
55. CEDAW, supra note 47, at art. 5.
56. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as “a unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, ac-
cepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modi-
fy the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. Amnesty International states in a report:
Reservations to CEDAW reveal that while it is widely ratified in the re-
gion, it is also subject to reservations that substantially hinder its imple-
mentation. These reservations are very broad and lack clarity and preci-
sion. Most are related to Articles 2 and 16, considered by the Committee 
to be core provisions of the Convention, and any reservations to these ar-
ticles are therefore incompatible with it. These reservations relate to the 
object and purpose of the Convention, and therefore are prohibited by 
international law. They would mean that discrimination against women 
is effectively sustained in law and practice, and deny women the protec-
tion against discrimination and violence. This is particularly so, as na-
tional legislation in the region, including the religiously-inspired ones, is 
often discriminatory against women.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: WEAKENING 
THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA REGION 15 (2004), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/42ae98b80.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7Q6-ZMMP].
57. Linda M. Keller, The Impact of States Parties’ Reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV.
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have entered reservations on these two articles alone.58 These reserva-
tions have, in large part, suffocated CEDAW’s potential by limiting the 
number of Member States who follow the article guidelines.59
4. 1985 World Conference on Women
As the United Nations Decade for Women came to an end in 
1985, 157 nations met together at the World Conference on Women.60
The task of the conference was to review and evaluate the work of the 
past decade.61 The objectives of the decade were equality, development,
and peace.62 The general discussion of the conference recognized the 
need for women to live securely under conditions of equality and jus-
tice, while also recognizing that it requires time to change traditional 
views and cultural stereotypes.63 While the Conference celebrated many 
improvements,64 it also noted the large disparity between the legal status 
and reality of women.65 The areas of particular concern were women’s 
access to healthcare, family planning, employment, water, and food re-
sources, as well as the prevalence of violence against women and wom-
en’s ability to participate in decision-making.66 For example, even after 
the ratification of CEDAW, the Conference reported that multiple fac-
tors, including traditional customs and laws, blocked women’s control
over their own fertility and family planning.67
309, 312-17 (2014) (explaining that because reservations are allowed on WPS initia-
tives it inhibits CEDAW’s main purpose).
58. To view the reservations lodged by States, please refer to the U.N. Treaty Collection, 
available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Index.aspx?clang=_en.
59. HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 127-28. Recent developments in CEDAW include 
the “No Reservations Movement” because of family law and local religious conflicts 
with women’s rights led by Muslim women.
60. The Conference culminated in the adoption of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strate-
gies for the Advancement of Women, to be implemented by the year 2000. See Third
World Conference on Women, Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise 
the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and 
Peace, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 (July 15-26, 1985).
61. See generally id.
62. Id. ¶ 9.
63. Id. ¶ 115.
64. Id. ¶ 99.
65. Id. ¶ 103.
66. Id. ¶¶ 112-13.
67. Id. ¶ 130.
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The Conference concluded that merely stating provisions that re-
quired equality was not the same as attaining real gender equality.68 In 
fact, following the Conference, women’s participation in the U.N. in-
creased yet participation still fell far below the targets.69 These targets 
were not met on any level of involvement, both within governmental 
and non-governmental activities. Though the Conference concluded 
that women’s participation in security initiatives is essential for continu-
ing global security, women’s involvement in peace research and educa-
tion remained limited.70
Recognizing that the goals for the Decade for Women had not 
been met, the Conference recommended and the General Assembly ap-
proved an ongoing evaluation of statistical data on women.71 The Con-
ference used this statistical research to create strategies for the advance-
ment of women;72 these strategies provide a practical and effective guide 
for global action on a long-term basis.73 One of the first strategies aimed 
to get all the governments that had not signed CEDAW to do so.74 This 
was done with the belief that the first step to encourage women’s in-
volvement in statewide and global security initiatives was to create legis-
lation to counter established inequality in accordance with CEDAW’s
emphasis that “the effectiveness of any legislative measures . . . must be 
reinforced by appropriate legal redress mechanisms.”75 This emphasis 
was placed with the understanding that CEDAW has no inherent en-
forcement mechanism, but only provides a basis for States to seek en-
forcement on their own.
It is worth noting here that the voluntary nature of accession to 
CEDAW undercuts its effectiveness. Even if CEDAW contained the 
necessary provisions to resolve many of the issues of gender inequality in 
domestic law provisions and practice, it still lacks the enforcement 
mechanisms that would be present if the Security Council invoked 
Chapter VII authority.76 As will be discussed below, the failed enforce-
68. Id. ¶ 17.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 234.
71. Id. ¶ 317.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 38.
74. Id. ¶ 60.
75. Commission of the European Communities, The Nairobi World Conference, Women 
of Europe Supplement No. 24, 24 (April 1986), X/154/86/EN.
76. The Security Council explains:
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the frame-
work within which the Security Council may take enforcement action. It 
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ment options of international agreements such as CEDAW is one of the 
reasons this Article proposes that the Security Council invoke Chapter 
VII authority.
5. 1995 Beijing Conference
Despite the optimism generated by CEDAW, the early 1990s 
highlighted that there was still much work to do if the international 
community was to achieve gender equality. For example, Member States 
frequently utilized legal loopholes to make reservations on treaties that 
furthered women’s initiatives. Further, the emergence of Bosnian rape 
camps and the Rwandan genocide in the early 1990s emphasized the 
gendered nature of war and its unequal impact on women in the inter-
national community.77
The Fourth Annual Conference for Women held in Beijing sought 
to directly confront those issues.78 Organizers and attendees of the Con-
ference presented success stories of women who were involved in their 
nation’s peacebuilding efforts,79 identifying for the first time the im-
portance of women’s involvement in security and peacebuilding. Partic-
ipants included victims of the Northern Ireland “Troubles,” Rwandan 
Genocide and Bosnian war survivors, and South African activists, whose 
homes had all been ravaged by war and who longed for peace.80 These 
allows the Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to make recommendations 
or to resort to non-military and military action to “maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”
Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,
UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/
repertoire/actions [https://perma.cc/743U-PYFH].
77. See generally Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender 
Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS. 65, 65-70
(1999).
78. ANDERLINI, supra note 22, at 5.
79. Id. at 6.
80. There were several notable participants at the Beijing Conference including Rwanda, 
Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Within these three Member States, individual 
women and civil society women’s organizations became involved in the peace process 
of their nations. ANDERLINI, supra note 22, at 6. In the case of Northern Ireland, the 
Women’s Coalition formed to combine all smaller women’s groups, even across con-
flict lines. Because of this, the leaders of the Women’s Coalition were able to repre-
sent women’s interests in the Good Friday agreement. Similar achievements were 
made by other notable attendees of the Beijing Conference, their experiences being 
essential to the themes of the conference. These cases demonstrate that the inclusion 
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participants promoted the involvement of women in peacebuilding by 
sharing their experiences of working with others to forward the plight of 
women in situations of conflict.81 The Beijing Conference launched a 
global revolution, inspiring women to step into the realm of global 
peace and security.82
Additionally, the conference produced the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action,83 a comprehensive plan for securing women’s 
equality. The Conference’s Declaration reflected the progress that had 
been made but also identified that there was still much work to do:
Absolute poverty and the feminization of poverty, unem-
ployment, the increasing fragility of the environment, con-
tinued violence against women and the widespread exclusion 
of half of humanity from institutions of power and govern-
ance underscore the need to continue the search for devel-
opment, peace and security and for ways of assuring people-
centered sustainable development. The participation and 
leadership of the half of humanity that is female is essential to 
the success of that search. One of full and equal partnership 
will enable the world to meet the challenges of the twenty-
first century.84
Despite the progress made at the Conference, including centering 
the stories of women and the production of the Declaration, not all 
States attended or participated.85 For example, though the United 
States, Russia and China attended and participated, countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not 
attend.86 The lack of universal participation even after a decade of em-
of women does not inhibit progress towards peace and security, but rather enhances 
it. Kate Fearon & Monica McWilliams, Swimming Against the Mainstream: The 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, in GENDER, DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSION IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 117-37 (Carmel Roulston & Celia Davies eds., 2000); 
ANDERLINI, supra note 22, at 6.
81. ANDERLINI, supra note 22, at 6.
82. Id.
83. Fourth World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONG.177/20/Rev.1 (Aug. 24, 1995).
84. Id. ¶ 17.
85. See id. ¶¶ 135-37 (listing state attendees of Beijing Conference).
86. Id. Some of the greatest perpetrators against women’s rights were not in attendance at 
the conference or were forbidden attendance. Dianne Otto, Holding up Half the Sky, 
but for Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 6
AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 7 (1996).
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phasizing women’s issues, was sobering. Thus, while recognizing that 
positive steps were taken in the last decade, the Declaration highlighted 
the continuing theme that “[t]he popular participation of women in key 
decision-making as full and equal partners with men, particularly in pol-
itics, has not yet been achieved.”87
6. International Criminal Court
Another milestone along the path to gender equality as a tool to ac-
complish world peace was the formation of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).88 The ICC is based on the Rome Statute that was signed 
in 1998 and has gained widespread acceptance.89 The Rome Statute was 
one of the first legal entities to seriously address WPS concerns. It spe-
cifically criminalizes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity” as crimes against humanity when carried out as part 
of a widespread, systematic, and directed attack.90 The Rome Statute al-
so grants the ICC authority to prosecute individuals for genocide, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression91 on an international level.92 Rape is 
explicitly included as war crime and the Statute allows all victims, in-
cluding women, to procure reparations through court hearings. For ex-
ample, a recent ICC case convicted former Congolese rebel commander 
Bosco Ntaganda on charges of rape and sexual violence among other 
87. Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 83, at 9.
88. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
38544, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en [https://perma.cc/NRA8-PRMM] [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute].
89. “123 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Out of them 33 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are 
from Eastern Europe, 28 are from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 are 
from Western European and other States.” The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc
/D7CS-R58C].
90. Rome Statute, supra note 88, at art. 7, ¶ 1(g).
91. Article 8 bis in the Amendments to the Rome Statute adopted in Kampala defines the 
individual crime of aggression as the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by 
a person in a leadership position of an act of aggression. This crime must also be in 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. UNITED NATIONS, AMENDMENTS TO 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2010), 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-
ENG-CoA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG6G-VQ7X].
92. Rome Statute, supra note 88, at art. 5.
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crimes.93 This and other subsequent cases are a clear step in the right di-
rection.94
B. UNSCR 1325
Concurrent with these pre-UNSCR 1325 developments, social sci-
ence research that drew connections between international peace and 
security and the treatment of women by individual States began to gain 
recognition.95 As mentioned earlier in the Article, the work by Valerie 
Hudson and others has been groundbreaking in this area in drawing a 
correlation between the security and equal treatment of women within a 
country and the overall peacefulness of that country.96 While this rela-
tionship is not causal in nature, the strength of the correlation led many 
individuals and organizations to include this correlation within their call 
on the U.N. to formally recognize gender equality as vital to peace and 
security.97 As will be discussed below, because the Security Council is 
the U.N. organ tasked with maintaining international peace and securi-
ty, many advocates looked to the Security Council as a vehicle for creat-
ing real change.
In 2000, President of the Security Council, Anwarul Karim Chow-
dhury, became a firm supporter of gender equality and international 
peace and security after meeting with women’s groups and familiarizing 
himself with WPS proposals.98 In his speech on International Women’s 
Day in March of 2000, Chowdhury explained:
Peace is inextricably linked with equality between women 
and men. [The Security Council] affirm[s] that the equal ac-
cess and full participation of women in power structures and 
their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and 
93. Bosco Ntaganda, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalition
fortheicc.org/cases/bosco-ntaganda [https://perma.cc/976F-YM97].
94. Case summaries, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases [https://perma.cc/
S9DC-RRR8].
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. See HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 95-118.
97. See, e.g., Women and the Demography-Security Nexus, supra note 6.
98. See Press Release, Security Council, Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality Between 
Women and Men Says Security Council, in Int’l Women’s Day Statement, U.N. 
Press Release SC/6816 (Mar. 8, 2000).
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resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace and security.99
This moment marked a significant turning point in WPS discourse. 
This was the first speech by a Security Council President that was solely 
dedicated to WPS initiatives.100
On October 31, 2000 the Security Council unanimously adopted 
UNSCR 1325,101 which charged Member States with providing protec-
tion for women and girls in war, and ensuring the full participation of 
women in humanitarian, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and post-
conflict reconstruction initiatives. Following the Beijing Conference on 
Women, CEDAW, and the Rome Statute, UNSCR 1325 marked a vi-
tal step towards the international recognition of women’s rights.102
UNSCR 1325 introduced and emphasized three key themes: 1) 
women and girls are significantly and disproportionately impacted by 
armed conflict; 2) women need to be more involved in decision-making 
bodies with respect to the resolution of armed conflict and the peace-
making process, including all aspects of U.N. work; and 3) as an ac-
countability measure, the Secretary-General must create an annual re-
port to the Security Council, measuring the success of the first two 
themes.103
Governments and scholars have described UNSCR 1325 as the 
first time the Security Council has given “full-fledged attention to gen-
dered aspects of peace and conflict” and “one of the most crucial U.N.
resolution on peace and security policy.”104 Perhaps one of the most im-
pactful messages in UNSCR 1325 was the Security Council’s formal 
recognition of the connection between the treatment of women and in-
ternational peace and security:
99. Id. ¶ 1.
100. GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 43, at 12.
101. UNSCR 1325, supra note 2.
102. See Antal Berkes, The Contribution of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, in
GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND UNSC RESOLUTION 1325 43, 44 (Seema Shek-
hawat ed., 2018), where the author catalogues the references to UNSCR 1325 and 
subsequent UNSCRs on women, peace and security, and then argues that the 
CEDAW Committee has done much to “deepen” and “widen” UNSCR 1325’s ap-
plication.
103. UNSCR 1325, supra note 2, at n.16.
104. Seema Shekhawat, Introduction, in GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND UNSC
RESOLUTION 1325 1, 4 (Seema Shekhawat ed., 2018).
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[UNSCR 1325] reaffirm[s] the important role of women in 
the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in [peacebuild-
ing], and stress[es] the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase 
their role in decision-making with regard to conflict preven-
tion and resolution.105
Though the research tying gender equality to international peace and 
security was in its early stages when the Resolution was adopted, this 
recognition was both groundbreaking and innovative, setting the stage 
for all subsequent UNSCRs and U.N. actions.106 While it is easy to de-
bate the international community’s overall effectiveness in accomplish-
ing the goals of UNSCR 1325, it would be near impossible to argue 
that the world is not a better place because of its passage, even if only 
because of the way the Security Council elevated the importance of 
gender equality by passing such a sweeping resolution.
C. Post-UNSCR 1325 Actions
It is widely accepted that UNSCR 1325 has proven to be a starting 
point on the issue of gender equality and world peace rather than a final 
statement. In tandem with adoption of UNSCR 1325, the Interagency 
Network on Women and Gender Equality107 established the Interagency 
Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security chaired by the Special Adviser 
on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women.108 This taskforce devel-
105. UNSCR 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 5.
106. What is UNSCR 1325?, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, https://www.usip.org/gender
_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 [https://perma.cc/8RVQ-5QP9].
107. The U.N. explains:
The Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality 
(IANWGE) is a network of Gender Focal Points in United Nations of-
fices, specialized agencies, funds and programmes and is chaired by UN 
Women . . . The Network has played a central role in promoting gender 
equality throughout the United Nations system and in follow-up to the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the twen-
ty-third special session of the General Assembly (Beijing +5) in 2000.
Introduction, INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON WOMEN AND GENDER EQUAL.,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/ [https://perma.cc/L3WM-Y2WE].
108. As of 2004, the Taskforce includes representatives from nineteen different organiza-
tions including the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as observers from International Or-
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oped an action plan to implement UNSCR 1325, which included pro-
ducing annual reports on the resolution’s impact across the globe.109
While these annual reports aimed to compile lessons from attempts 
at the widespread implementation of UNSCR 1325’s broad goals, they 
still did not reach every issue in the WPS agenda. As Natalie Florea 
Hudson noted:
Although 1325 represents the broadest political interpreta-
tion of gender issues ever articulated by the U.N. peace and 
security agenda, it does not, by any means, reflect the entire 
agenda of issues related to women, peace, and security. It 
does not for example address overall disarmament and the 
militarized approach of the U.N. system to establishing peace 
and security.110
Recognizing that UNSCR 1325 did not address all the issues related to 
gender equality and international peace and security, the Security 
Council has adopted several other111 Security Council Resolutions deal-
ing with WPS.112 These resolutions are representative of the Security 
ganization for Migration and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Se-
curity (Hague Appeal for Peace, International Alert, International Women’s Tribune 
Centre, Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Women’s Committee on Refugee 
Women and Children, and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). 
The Inter-Agency Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security was initiated in February 
2001 to follow up on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 
adopted on 31 October 2000. Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security, INTER-
AGENCY NETWORK ON WOMEN AND GENDER EQUALITY, https://www.un.org/
womenwatch/ianwge/activities/tfwpsecurity.htm [https://perma.cc/ED6Q-XZ54].
109. The 2003 annual report described the achievements of the Taskforce in 2002 and 
includes information on needs assessment checklists, briefing notes for Security 
Council missions and analysis of the gender content of Secretary-General’s reports to 
the Security Council. See Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, 
Rep. of the Second Session of the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality,
U.N. Doc. IANWGE/2003/12/Rev.1 (Mar. 28, 2013).
110. GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 43, at 20 n.45.
111. S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019) (calling for all Member States to implement specific, 
time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, as the U.N. recognized the lack 
of progress in this area. It recognized the need for integration, response and elimina-
tion of sexual violence at the national level).
112. Peace Women explains:
In response to persistent pressure from civil society, the [UNSC] has 
adopted nine resolutions on [WPS]. These resolutions are: 1325 (2000); 
1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 
2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), and 2467 (2019). These nine resolutions 
make up the [WPS] Agenda. They guide work to promote gender equali-
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Council’s continued belief in the correlation between gender treatment 
and international peace and security. For example, UNSCR 1889 states:
[The Security Council] [r]emain[s] deeply concerned about 
the persistent obstacles to women’s full involvement in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts and participation in 
post-conflict public life, as a result of violence and intimida-
tion, lack of security and lack of rule of law, cultural discrim-
ination and stigmatization, including the rise of extremist or 
fanatical views on women, and socio-economic factors in-
cluding the lack of access to education, and in this respect, 
recognizing that the marginalization of women can delay or 
undermine the achievement of durable peace, security and 
reconciliation.113
Cumulatively, the resolutions form an international legislative 
framework that reinforces existing global commitments, treatises, and 
resolutions on women’s rights114 and supports and encourages additional 
actions designed to further gender equality. The following sections de-
tail two particular actions that have reinforced the call to action initiated 
by UNSCR 1325. National Action Plans provide a means for a State to 
self-evaluate its own compliance with the suggestions of UNSCR 1325 
and subsequent resolutions. The Secretary-General’s 2015 report on 
UNSCR 1325 reflects the U.N.’s review of general compliance with 
UNSCR 1325.
1. National Action Plans (NAPs)
NAPs are individualized state plans to bring about the better 
treatment of women and girls, often with particular respect to their 
ty and strengthen women’s participation, protection and rights across the 
conflict cycle, from conflict prevention through post-conflict reconstruc-
tion.
The Resolutions, PEACE WOMEN, http://peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions
/resolutions [https://perma.cc/A7BA-3EG8].
113. S.C. Res. 1889, ¶ 8 (Oct. 5, 2009).
114. U.N. WOMEN, WOMEN AND PEACE AND SECURITY: GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2010), https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/
attachments/sections/library/publications/2012/10/wpssourcebook-02b-planon
womenpeacesecurity-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1154 [https://perma.cc/3J42-5JNC].
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treatment in and around armed conflict.115 NAPs allow for both state 
specificity as well as state accountability. Though not mandated by the 
text of UNSCR 1325, NAPs grew out of the evidence that little was 
happening across the international community to actually promote the 
intent of the resolution. First the President of the Security Council in 
2002116 and then the Secretary-General in 2004117 “noted the lack of 
progress for women and girls and invited U.N. Member States to pre-
pare NAPs in order to take strong steps toward implementing UNSCR 
1325.”118
Jan Marie Fritz, a sociologist who specializes in the status of wom-
en and girls within the international community, has highlighted the 
elements of an effective NAP, including seventeen points that would be 
especially “useful for government and civil society representatives to dis-
cuss” when formulating or revising NAPs.119 Fritz goes on to recom-
mend “four important topics that need to be specifically considered 
when drafting or implementing a[] NAP”: Human rights, just peace, 
political will, and human security.120 Further details regarding NAP im-
plementation are discussed in Section III.A.
115. Jan Marie Fritz, Creating or Improving a National Action Plan Based on U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1325, in GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND UNSC RESOLUTION 
1325 83 (Seema Shekhawat ed., 2018); Melody Hood, What are National Action 




116. The Security Council “encourage[d] Member States . . . and other relevant actors, to 
develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables” and “to develop 
targeted activities, focused on the specific constraints facing women and girls in post-
conflict situations.” U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, ¶ 9 U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/32 (Oct. 31, 2002).
117. U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 10 U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2004/40 (Oct. 28, 2004). This statement “welcome[d] the efforts of 
Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, includ-
ing the development of national action plans, and encourage[d] Member States to 
continue to pursue such implementation.” Id.
118. Fritz, supra note 115, at 83.
119. The seventeen points are listed as follows: 1) The publication date of the plan; 2) The 
length of the plan; 3) Organization of the plan; 4) Plan leadership; 5) Responsibilities 
regarding action points; 6) Communication among those developing and delivering 
the plan; 7) Advertising and promotion of UNSR 1325 and the NAP; 8) Gender per-
spective and language; 9) Age sensitivity and other considerations; 10) Geographical 
focus; 11) Contents of the NAP in comparison to what is specified in the UNSCR 
1325 and the supporting resolutions; 12) Priorities; 13) Collecting needed data; 14) 
Continuing evaluation; 15) Reporting and feedback; 16) Financial allocation; and
17) Monitoring by civil society. Id. at 85-89.
120. Id. at 89-90.
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2. 2015 Report on UNSCR 1325
In October 2015, the U.N. held a high-level review of UNSCR 
1325 to mark the Resolution’s fifteenth anniversary and continue to ad-
vance its goals.121 From this review, U.N. Women122 published a report 
titled Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A 
Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325, mapping progress and challenges in achieving gender 
equality, and making recommendations for advancing the goals of the 
resolution.123 The global study was primarily authored by Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, a lawyer, diplomat, and human rights advocate who 
served as the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Spe-
cial Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. It states:
[UNSCR 1325 has taken] a significant step to integrate gen-
der into the overall framework of conflict and war. The his-
toric resolution marked the international body’s full-fledged 
attention to gendered aspects of peace and conflict and its 
commitment toward an active involvement of women in the 
formal peace processes. The resolution was one of the most 
crucial U.N. resolutions on peace and security policy as it 
121. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 13.
122. U.N. Women is a U.N. entity dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of 
women. See About U.N. Women, U.N. WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en
/about-us/about-un-women [https://perma.cc/4CZS-WWJ2].
123. The Report explains:
Resolution 1325 was one of the crowning achievements of the global 
women’s movement and one of the most inspired decisions of the United 
Nations Security Council. The recognition that peace is inextricably 
linked with gender equality and women’s leadership was a radical step for 
the highest body tasked with the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Turning the Security Council’s words into actions and real 
change has been a central pillar of U.N. Women’s work since the entity 
was created, and the driving passion of many other actors since the reso-
lution was adopted as a global norm in 2000. And yet there remains a 
crippling gap between the ambition of our commitments and actual po-
litical and financial support. We struggle to bridge the declared intent of 
international policymaking and the reality of domestic action in the 
many corners of the world where resolution 1325 is most needed.
COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 5.
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mandated to Member States to adopt specific policies to en-
sure women’s active involvement in peace.124
The study lists several “signs of progress” in the treatment of women.125
For example, progress was noted with regards to including women in 
the peace process.126 First, the Report notes that “there has been an 
appreciable rise in the number of references to women in the text of 
peace agreements”127 and that the references to women are “more likely 
to be found in agreements where the United Nations was involved.”128
Additionally, the Report found that “it has become a more routine 
practice both to include gender experts in mediation support teams, and 
to consult with women’s organizations”129 and that, while moving “at far 
too slow a rate . . . the overall participation of women in peace processes 
is inching upwards.”130
Ultimately, the global study presents a mixed verdict. Despite the 
transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 (and its progeny) and the 
many successes identified, the 2015 global study finds that “much of the 
progress toward the implementation of resolution 1325 continues to be 
124. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 4.
125. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 44.
126. Id. at 40-44.
127. Id. at 44. The Report also notes:
Out of 1,168 peace agreements signed between January 1990 and Janu-
ary 2014, only 18 per cent make any references to women or gender. But 
if one looks at before and after the adoption of resolution 1325, the dif-
ference is notable. Prior to 2000, only 11 per cent carried such a refer-
ence. Post-2000, this percentage has increased to 27 per cent. While this 
is still a low percentage, the trend nevertheless is encouraging. As moni-
tored by the UN Department of Political Affairs using the global indica-
tors on implementation of 1325, 50 per cent of peace agreements signed 
in 2014 included references relevant to women, peace and security, up 
from 22 per cent in 2010.
Id. (citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 45. The Report also stated:
According to DPA’s monitoring, gender expertise was provided by the 
UN to 88 per cent of relevant processes in 2013 but only 67 per cent in 
2014. This is nevertheless a significant improvement from 36 per cent in 
2011. Similarly, 88 per cent of all peace processes with UN engagement 
in 2014 included regular consultations with women’s organizations, a no-
table rise from 50 per cent in 2011.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id.
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measured in ‘firsts,’ rather than as standard practice.”131 Even after fif-
teen years, multiple UNSCRs and reports, worldwide conferences and 
other initiatives, and the emphasis on, creation of, and implementation 
of a significant number of NAPs, a gap remains between “the ambition 
of our commitments and actual political and financial support. We 
struggle to bridge the declared intent of international policymaking with 
the reality of domestic action in the many corners of the world where 
resolution 1325 is most needed.”132
Cumulatively,133 all initiatives to date reflect a commitment to and 
an urgency in recognizing gender equality as part of human security. 
However, they also demonstrate a lack of effective, meaningful change. 
The diplomatic language, impressive discussions, and assurances rarely 
result in actual action to correct the situation.134 The U.N.’s reports and 
recommendations evidence a lack of sufficient implementation. This 
lack of meaningful implementation is the most vexing problem preclud-
ing real progress in the area of gender equality.
III. Ineffectiveness of UNSCR 1325-Generated Efforts
“As far as gender equality is concerned, the gap, between theory and practice, 
rhetoric and exercise, is apparent through the formulation and implementa-
tion of the much acclaimed United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325.”135
Despite the efforts catalogued above, the international community 
still faces, and at times perpetuates, incredibly difficult hurdles to 
achieving gender equality. As stated in the United Nation’s recent Sus-
tainable Development Goal 5, Gender Equality, “discriminatory laws 
and social norms remain pervasive, women continue to be underrepre-
sented at all levels of political leadership, and one in five women and 
girls between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine report experiencing phys-
ical or sexual violence by an intimate partner within a twelve-month pe-
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id. at 5.
133. It is important to note that another supporting U.N. document following 1325 was 
Sustainable Development Goals 5: Achieve Gender Equality, Empowering All Wom-
en and Girls. Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls,
UNITED NATIONS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS, https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/ [https://perma.cc/55Z9-JX7H].
134. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 1.
135. Id.
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riod.”136 That these problems persist even twenty years after the passage 
of UNSCR 1325 is an indictment of the efforts the international com-
munity has previously relied on to make meaningful change.
Without the Security Council invoking the mandatory language in 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to pass its resolutions on gender equal-
ity, Member States are not legally obliged to implement resolutions like 
UNSCR 1325. This has led some to conclude that “inconsistent im-
plementation of [the] resolution . . . continues to be a major chal-
lenge”137 at least in part because the non-obligatory nature of these Secu-
rity Council resolutions allows each State to decide how or even whether 
to implement a resolution.138 Countries are asked to “consider” actions 
and are “called upon” or “urged” to undertake them, rather than re-
quired to act under their Article 24 and 25 obligations, as discussed be-
low in Part IV.A. Indeed, many Member States’ policymakers ignore, or 
refuse to recognize, the gendered nature of peace and security.139
In order to address these inefficiency concerns and better imple-
ment UNSCR 1325, the Security Council issues annual reports on the 
WPS agenda progress. In aggregating the reports, six general areas of 
concern emerge as prominent obstacles to UNSCR 1325’s implementa-
tion.140 These obstacles are: 1) the lack of political support and com-
mitment; 2) cultural norms; 3) cooperation between government and 
136. Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls, supra note 133
(“Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation 
for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world.”).
137. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
¶ 18, U.N. Doc.S/2008/622 (Sep. 25, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report on Women 
and Peace and Security].
138. F. Belgin Gumru & Jan Marie Fritz, Women, Peace and Security: An Analysis of the 
National Action Plans Developed in Response to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 4 
SOCIETIES WITHOUT BORDERS 209, 211 (2009).
139. See Oudraat, supra note 42, at 617.
140. A 2002 Security Council Report found:
In his first report to the Security Council on women, peace and security 
(S/2002/1154), the Secretary-General recognized that resolution 1325 
(2000) had galvanized Member States, the United Nations system and 
civil society, including at the grass-roots level. Although the contributions 
of women to peacemaking and peacebuilding had not yet been fully rec-
ognized, the suffering of women and girls during armed conflict and its 
aftermath had already been widely documented. In the same report, the 
Secretary-General also noted that international law and existing strategies 
and guidelines provided a strong framework for addressing gender per-
spectives within the context of armed conflict and its aftermath.
U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2010/498 (Sep. 28, 2010).
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civil society; 4) education and resources on the benefits of UNSCR 
1325; 5) lack of involvement of women in the peace process; and 6) no
guarantees of security and safety for civil groups.141 These areas, particu-
larly those addressing cultural and patriarchal hurdles within nations, 
are near-impossible to overcome without specific, concerted efforts.142
A. Political Support and Commitment
Because the Security Council did not adopt UNSCR 1325 and 
subsequent WPS resolutions under Chapter VII, States are left to de-
termine for themselves whether or how to implement them. As Oudraat 
commented:
Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and advancement of the 
women, peace, and security agenda has suffered from the lack 
of political commitment at the highest levels; the lack of 
strong systematic empirical evidence to infuse policy and in-
form best practices; and the lack of integration into main-
stream international relations and security studies, including 
the lack of conceptual frameworks other than feminist con-
ceptions of peace and security.143
This conclusion is reflected in the lack of Member States that have cre-
ated a NAP.144 NAPs provide a mechanism for governments to set prior-
ities in WPS policy-making and enable civil society to hold governments 
accountable,145 but currently less than 42% of Member States have a 
NAP.146
When States do enact NAPs, they are often inadequate or misguid-
ed. Though obviously well-meaning, “the action plans of developed 
141. For a complete list of the annual reports concerning WPS, as well as those specific to 
each resolution that came out of 1325, see UN Documents for Women, Peace and Se-




142. Compare HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at CP11, Map 11 (revealing areas of the 
world that have accepted WPS initiatives, yet do not put it to practice) with Press Re-
lease, supra note 12.
143. Oudraat, supra note 42, at 613.
144. National-Level Implementation, PEACE WOMEN, https://www.peacewomen.org/
member-states [https://perma.cc/JWH5-59AK].
145. Hood, supra note 115.
146. National-Level Implementation, supra note 144.
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countries are almost exclusively focused on actions in other, conflict-
affected countries . . . [and] are often defined without the input of civil 
society organizations or the people subsequently affected by the respec-
tive interventions.”147 States with externally-focused NAPS often miss 
the need for domestic improvement.
Even States that enact NAPs and attempt to increase the participa-
tion of women in the political sphere face domestic problems. Accord-
ing to a 2016 Security Council Report, when women do enter the polit-
ical sphere, they are frequently attacked or persecuted, both by their 
colleagues and by their constituents, if they do not behave according to 
gendered norms.148 Often, there is little response by the government to 
protect these women. This is further evidence of the lack of political 
support for and commitment to UNSCR 1325. The U.N. has attempt-
ed to fix this problem. For example, in 2015, the U.N. provided tech-
nical assistance for gender-sensitive electoral processes and helped estab-
lish quotas for women leaders in the Afghanistan and Mali 
governments.149 However, the Report further illustrates that while set-
ting quotas and providing election assistance is a step forward in nation-
al politics, data indicates that “women’s representation rates tend to be 
much lower [in local government] than at national levels.”150 Involving 
women in political processes ultimately begins at the local level.151
Without local involvement, women’s political advancements in their re-
spective countries will remain incomplete.152
147. Corey Barr, The Commodification of Intervention, in GENDER, CONFLICT, PEACE,
AND UNSC RESOLUTION 1325 107, 113 (Seema Shekhawat ed., 2018).
148. A Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security explains:
I am concerned about continued threats and attacks against, and the per-
secution of, those who do not conform to gender norms, whether they be 
women political leaders, journalists or human rights defenders, women 
justice and security sector personnel, civil society leaders or those per-
ceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex.
U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/2016/822 (Sept. 29, 2016).
149. Id. ¶¶ 52-53.
150. Id. ¶ 54.
151. See id.
152. Compare HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at CP8, map 5, with Women and Peace and 
Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 148, at ¶ 54.
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B. Cultural Norms
Patriarchal and sociocultural stereotypes prevent women from en-
gaging in peace and governing processes and from obtaining legal 
rights.153 Social scientist Seema Shekhawat argues that “[a]ssumptions 
about what roles women are appropriate for are more than often con-
straining. Such assumptions are not incidental[;] they are ingrained. 
They are carefully crafted by the patriarchal system to produce and re-
produce the superiority of a particular gender.”154 Shekhawat points to 
stereotypes in many Nigerian communities that women are victims, 
which, combined with a strict division of labor, exclude women from 
the peace process.155 Scholar Corey Barr agrees and argues that “one key 
flaw [of UNSCR 1325] is that the resolution presents women only in 
gendered terms with no regard to the way gender intersects with ele-
ments of identity, such as race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, age, 
religion, and so forth.”156 Shekhawat further laments that this standard 
approach of “homogenizing women” fails to consider “the issue of in-
terpretation, localization, adaptation, and implementation.”157
Legally homogenizing half the world’s population leads to a myriad 
of discriminatory practices, many based in both international and do-
mestic law. For example, sociocultural stereotypes around sexual vio-
lence often have ramifications when women try to enter government, 
but these stereotypes are specific to each community.158 According to 
the Security Council’s 2008 Annual Report, certain traditional and cul-
153. Onyinyechukwu Onyido, The Disconnection Between Theory and Practice: Achieving 
Item 8b of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, in GENDER, CONFLICT,
PEACE, AND UNSC RESOLUTION 1325 143, 146-47 (Seema Shekhawat ed., 2018).
154. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 10.
155. Onyido explains:
In many Nigerian communities, sociocultural stereotypes of women as 
victims, combined with a strict division of labor in the public and private 
spheres, prevent women from entering official peace processes. Most 
women in these communities are illiterate. They are excluded from ac-
tivities that make up normal peace processes in the peace and security 
agenda . . . .
Onyido, supra note 153, at 146-47.
156. Barr, supra note 147, at 108-09.
157. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 9.
158. See U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/66
/657*S/2012/33 (Jan. 13, 2012) (finding “cultural practices and norms also tend to 
take precedence over written legislation in some contexts, where the burden of re-
sponsibility and proof falls on the victim”).
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tural norms engender a “culture of impunity on which sexual violence 
thrives.”159 In Côte d’Ivoire, justice for victims is hindered by traditional 
and cultural norms that accept rape, female genital mutilation, and 
forced marriage.160 Similarly, in Timor-Leste, “cases of sexual violence 
are frequently ‘resolved’ through traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, which are not always victim-centered and are not regulated by a 
legal framework.”161 Not all women are the same throughout the world 
or even within a small community—they represent a vast array of inter-
ests, problems, capabilities, attributes, and talents. Yet attempts to diver-
sify the legal description and treatment of women encroach on long and 
deeply held traditions and commitments. Professor Fionnuala Ni Aoláin 
argues:
One of the reasons there has been such a tepid response to 
addressing gender in a holistic way in counter-terrorism is 
that to do so comprehensively required undoing male privi-
lege, and this task has in a multitude of realms proven to be 
highly fraught for human rights practitioners over many dec-
ades.162
While gendered stereotypes due to cultural and patriarchal influ-
ences are pervasive in certain states,163 they are also present in interna-
tional resolutions and policymaking. Scholar Nadine Puechguirbal ex-
plains that U.N. documents consistently refer to women as “vulnerable 
individuals” which perpetuates their position as victims.164 Certainly, the 
majority of sexual assault and sexual violence survivors are women.165
159. 2008 Report on Women and Peace and Security, supra note 137, ¶ 7.
160. U.N. Secretary-General, Seventeenth Progress Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Unit-
ed Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. S/2008/451 (Jul. 10, 2008).
161. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (for the Period from 8 January to 8 July 2008), ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. 
S/2008/501 (July 29, 2008).
162. Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Masculinity, Jihad and Mobilization, JUST SEC. (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/33624/masculinity-jihad-mobilization/[https://perma.cc
/5V8B-8D4M].
163. Compare HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at Map 5, with Hudson, supra note 6.
164. Nadine Puechguirbal, Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual 
Analysis of UN Documents, 17 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 172, 172-73 (2010).
165. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR MEDICO-LEGAL CARE FOR VICTIMS OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 8 (2003), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/
42788/924154628X.pdf;jsessionid=4D7DD1BD18484B0E012E3481DAF0B747?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/MW8W-8WV5]. The WHO found that “[r]esearch 
indicates that the vast majority of victims of sexual violence are female, most perpe-
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However, persistently referring to women, as a class, as victims does not 
lend itself to elevating women as leaders in the peacemaking process.
Treating women as victims is a theme throughout the WPS UN-
SCRs. For example, UNSCR 1820 contains the following language that 
is repeated in almost every U.N. document concerning WPS:
[C]ivilians account for the vast majority of those adversely af-
fected by armed conflict . . . women and girls are particularly 
targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of 
war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or 
forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic 
group; and . . . sexual violence perpetrated in this manner 
may in some instances persist after the cessation of hostili-
ties.166
There is no doubt that this is factually true. But the international com-
munity should reflect on whether it is including women in the peace 
and security process merely because they are victims. Corey Barr recog-
nizes that labeling women as victims may be factual and done in good 
faith, but argues that it may do more harm than good:
[D]onor aid given in the name of implementing the [WPS] 
agenda has in some cases served to impede women’s agency, 
which may serve to limit their ability to play influential roles 
in peace processes. Additionally, by putting more emphasis 
on women’s need for protection, aid projects have cemented 
the idea of women as victims, thus in many cases entrenching 
traditional gender dynamics and providing limited support to 
local level priorities that may focus on other areas.167
He continues, “While not seeking to diminish the suffering of women 
and girls, the phrase of women and girls being ‘most affected’ is remi-
niscent of the much critiqued grouping of ‘women and children’ in ear-
lier literature and legal documents. Both phrasings infantilize women 
and serve to undermine their agency.”168
The indeterminacy of the term “most affected” may lead to false 
conclusions about the reality of the impact of armed conflict on women 
trators are male, and that most victims know their attacker. This does not, however, 
negate that fact that sexual violence against men and boys is also widespread.” Id.
166. S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 5 (June 19, 2008); see also Barr, supra note 147.
167. Barr, supra note 147, at 108.
168. Id. at 117.
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and girls. For example, it is clear that more men die in armed conflicts 
than women,169 so, if “most affected” is limited to being killed, the asser-
tion is clearly not true. However, if “most affected” relates to sexual vio-
lence, it is true that women suffer sexual violence more often than men 
during times of armed conflict.170
Ultimately, describing all women, and only women, as victims of 
violence is not only a generalization—women can also be perpetrators of 
violence and may take an active part in hostilities—but also unproduc-
tive as it seldom serves to place women in a position to actually deal 
with the issues that concern them in a meaningful way. Thus, trumpet-
ing women as victims only, often serves to limit the effectiveness of ef-
forts to implement gender equality.
C. Cooperation Between Government and Civil Society
The U.N. strives to engender dialogue between civil society groups, 
international charitable organizations, and local, national, and interna-
tional governing organizations in order to ensure civil society and other 
stakeholder groups are informed, supported, and represented in public 
decision-making processes. For example, the United Nations Office for 
West Africa (“UNOWA”) and the U.N. Integrated Peacebuilding Of-
fice in Sierra Leone (“UNIPSIL”) have institutionalized yearly dialogues 
between senior leaders and women, and the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations has called on the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations to establish regular open days as well.171 The U.N. has in-
creasingly encouraged the involvement of civil society actors, especially 
women’s groups, in implementing UNSCR 1325, as echoed in the 
2011 Annual Security Council Report:
Special envoys and mediators should meet with women lead-
ers and peace activists at the earliest possible moment in me-
diation processes. As a standard operating procedure, they 
should establish regular and structured consultations with 
169. CHRISTIN ORMHAUG, PATRICK MEIER & HELGA HERNES, ARMED CONFLICT 
DEATHS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER, PRIOR PAPERS 3 (2009).
170. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response, WOMEN2000, Apr. 
1998, at 2.
171. See U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. S/2011/598 (Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Report on 
Women and Peace and Security].
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women’s civil society groups and broker engagement between 
parties to armed conflict and women’s groups.172
However, it is imperative to keep in mind the balance that should be 
struck between utilizing top-down approaches and civil society move-
ments to achieve WPS goals, as sometimes top-down approaches have a 
limited reach.173
Additionally, assistance from international donors and organiza-
tions may be an effective way to advance gender equality, but may also 
undercut local government’s responsibilities thus harming the long-term 
infrastructure necessary for permanent change. In realistic but con-
demning tones, Barr writes:
Donor-driven policies fundamentally undermine the owner-
ship that partner countries have of technical assistance aid, 
but also weaken government ownership by overwhelming 
government coordination and management capacities. Be-
cause governments are overwhelmed with the proliferation of 
projects, management is largely in the hands of donors, effec-
tively weakening both the ownership of partner governments 
in the implementation of the allocated development aid and 
the harmonization of donor-funded projects.174
172. Id. ¶ 21.
173. Larry Attree, Celia McKeon, and Konstantin Bärwaldt explain:
The United States, European countries, the United Nations, and others 
are backing military, technical, financial, and diplomatic “security” initia-
tives all over the world, but their efforts often end up worsening and per-
petuating the conflicts they are supposed to stop or prevent. All the 
while, the people worst affected have very little say about what’s going on 
around them. Of course, these two problems are closely connected. In re-
sponse, many peace and rights activists around the world are considering 
how to change the dynamic and ensure people affected by conflict are lis-
tened to in the debates that shape international security interventions.
Larry Attree et al., The International Security Echo-Chamber: Getting Civil Society into 
the Room, JUST SEC. (July 31, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/65243/the-
international-security-echo-chamber-getting-civil-society-into-the-room/
[https://perma.cc/K7MV-QH6Z]; see also Jiang Jue, Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality in China: The Development and Struggle in Chains of State Feminism, in
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 253, 253-73 (Sarah Biddulph & Joshua 
Rosenzweig eds., 2019).
174. Barr, supra note 147, at 113.
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Barr argues that if donors manage the projects, those projects are not 
only unlikely to receive full government cooperation, but they are also 
unlikely to be meshed with other government initiatives.175 Assuming 
Barr is correct, getting government and civil society to work together to 
achieve gender equality in order to further international peace and secu-
rity will require a change in how international and domestic entities cur-
rently perceive and work with each other if true change is to be accom-
plished.
D. Education and Awareness of UNSCR 1325
Most governments, U.N. personnel, and civil society organizations 
are unaware of or misunderstand what UNSCR 1325 entails.176 The 
U.N. did not engage in substantial public awareness campaigns during 
the early 2000s, leading to either a late implementation or a complete 
lack of implementation in the subsequent decade.177 While the 2015 Se-
curity Council Annual Report “reaffirmed” the U.N.’s commitment to 
encouraging implementation of UNSCR 1325,178 as of August 2019, 
only 42% of Member States had a NAP.179 Most Member States still 
lack a complete understanding of what the Resolution entails, causing
the MIT International Studies Group to recommend that the U.N. fo-
cus on increasing “the visibility of UNSCR 1325 as a peace and security 
framework.”180
Some of this education and awareness work has been done by civil 
society groups. For example, one of the key players during the early 
formulation of the NAP initiative was the collective network of wom-
en’s groups and peace organizations known as WE Act 1325.181 The 
group’s central focus is to aid the formation and implementation of 
NAPs by all Member States.182 WE Act 1325 educates countries about 
175. See id.
176. SANAM NARAGHI ANDERLINI ET AL., WHAT THE WOMEN SAY: PARTICIPATION AND 
UNSCR 1325 3 (2010), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Gender/What_the
_Women_Say.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HC4-RQVQ].
177. Id.
178. S.C. Res. 2242, ¶ 1 (Oct. 13, 2015).
179. National-Level Implementation, supra note 144.
180. ANDERLINI ET. AL., supra note 176, at 6.
181. See Women Engaged in Action on 1325 (WE Act 1325), GLOB. NETWORK OF WOMEN 
PEACEBUILDERS, https://web.archive.org/web/20190509113738/https://gnwp.org
/members-directory-and-map/women-engaged-in-action-on-1325-we-act-1325/] (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2019).
182. Id.
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UNSCR 1325 and empowers other women’s human rights organiza-
tions to action through visibility and support.183
Other creative campaigns can provide important means to imple-
ment equality during armed conflict. For example, the ICRC spread 
awareness about the laws of armed conflict through publishing video-
games.184 More emphasis needs to be placed on educating individuals on 
WPS initiatives, rather than jumping straight into implementation. 
Awareness methods such as these, aimed at civil society and young peo-
ple, work towards the goal of educating Member States as a whole.
E. The Peace Process
UNSCR 1325 and its progeny focus on the inclusion of women in 
the peace process; specifically, UNSCR 1325 notes that the peacebuild-
ing process is in need of more equal gender representation to accomplish 
WPS goals.185 This Article does not dispute the value of UNSCR 1325’s 
approach. New evidence compiled by the International Peace Institute 
shows:
When women are included in a peace process, the peace 
agreement that results is 20 percent more likely to last at least 
183. See id.




1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at 
all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institu-
tions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of 
conflict; 2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic 
plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of 
women at decision making levels in conflict resolution and peace process-
es . . . 8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing 
peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) 
The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettle-
ment and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion; (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indig-
enous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of 
the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures 
that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and 
girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, 
the police and the judiciary.
UNSCR 1325, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1-2, 8.
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two years. Women’s participation has an even greater impact 
in the longer term: An agreement is 35 percent more likely to 
last for fifteen years if women participate in its creation.”186
The focus on gender equality in peacemaking processes may not only 
improve women’s standing in society, but also preserve lasting peace.
Despite the demonstrated value of women in the peace process, the 
exclusion of women remains a problem today. For example, in peace 
negotiations around the world between the years 1992 and 2011, only 
2% of chief mediators and 9% of negotiators were women.187 Shek-
hawat, noting the lack of progress, argues:
[I]t is necessary to take cognizance of the sad reality of the 
near-invisibility of women in the formal peace negotiations. 
In this masculinized process, more than often, women are 
not even accorded decorative presence. Resolution 1325, 
even with all its good intentions, has not been able to bring 
the essential change.188
Though there are undoubtedly many causes for the reluctance towards 
gender inclusion, at least one of these is the perception of women’s value 
by those at the state and community level. Researchers in this area have 
found that “off-the-record discussions with peacemakers, decision mak-
ers, and those who support and shape these processes show that many 
remain resistant to including women due to a lack of evidence about the 
value that women’s participation can bring and fear that it may derail 
the process.”189 An educational process for government officials and oth-
ers involved in peace processes that challenges cultural and historical bi-
ases may be required to overcome this lack of understanding and en-
courage more equal representation.190
However, even an increase in the number of women peacemakers 
will not necessarily lead to gender equality in the peacebuilding process. 
As Shekhawat argues, involving women in the peace process does not 
186. MARIE O’REILLY ET AL., REIMAGINING PEACEMAKING: WOMEN’S ROLES IN PEACE 
PROCESSES 12 (2015).
187. PABLO CASTILLO DIAZ & SIMON TORDJMAN, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE 3 (2nd ed. 
2012); COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 14, 45.
188. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 4.
189. O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 186, at 2.
190. See generally P.J. Henry, Institutional Bias, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE,
STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION 426-40 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2010).
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necessarily guarantee that their voices will be meaningfully heeded.191
Similar research from the U.N. report Making Women Count—Not Just 
Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Ne-
gotiations states:192
[M]aking women’s participation count is more important 
than merely counting the number of women included in the 
peace process . . . a strong presence of women, even directly 
at the negotiation table, does not automatically translate into 
their ability to assert a strong influence. It is the level of in-
fluence that women can assert on the process that makes a 
difference, not only their presence by numbers.193
Lasting peace is one of the most direct measures of successful interna-
tional peace and security initiatives. Recalling research stated in the sub-
section above, the inclusion of women in peace processes increases the 
percentage of years peace lasts within a society.194 Ensuring equal or near 
equal representation of women meaningfully participating in the peace 
process is not just a good idea—it is a requisite to achieving greater 
world peace.
191. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 7 (citing THANIA PAFFENHOLZ ET AL., MAKING 
WOMEN COUNT—NOT JUST COUNTING WOMEN: ASSESSING WOMEN’S INCLUSION 
AND INFLUENCE ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 21 (Leigh Pascal ed., 2016)).
192. PAFFENHOLZ ET AL., supra note 191, at 5, 55.
193. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 7 (quoting PAFFENHOLZ ET. AL., supra note 191, at 7). 
Catherine Powell also argues:
A democratic legitimacy account of inclusive security can reframe the 
WPS debate, because legitimacy turns on enhancing the representativeness
of the process as a whole, rather than opening up opportunities for wom-
en per se or expecting that women will “perform” in a particular 
way . . . the primary aim becomes legitimizing the exercise of power ra-
ther than enhancing the opportunities of individuals or a group. A legit-
imacy framework creates a new theoretical model in which gender bal-
ance is a collective democratic aim, rather than an equal opportunity right 
for a specific group.
Powell, supra note 4, at 271, 319.
194. See supra Part III.E; see also Olivia Holt-Ivry, Women Make Peace Stick, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Aug. 24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/24/women-make-peace-
stick/ [https://perma.cc/9GAZ-FSX7].
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F. Security and Safety for Civil Groups
Even if Member States are aware of UNSCR 1325, many ignore it 
due to a lack of respect for international and/or domestic WPS laws.195
When civil society groups try to implement WPS measures, they are of-
ten met with severe governmental opposition, including risks to the 
freedom and safety of their members. Thus, implementing UNSCR 
1325 is an unsafe endeavor for many.196
The 2004 Annual Report for UNSCR 1325 explained that while 
some understand the contribution that women make to the peacebuild-
ing process, the “obstacles to [women’s] participation and to the system-
atic incorporation of gender perspectives remain.”197 And, according to 
the 2017 Security Council Annual Report, these obstacles are more dif-
ficult to overcome but even more important in situations of “violent ex-
tremism.”198
Two brief examples from Russia and Northern Ireland illustrate 
the difficulties of implementing UNSCR 1325 in the face of domestic 
opposition.
195. HUDSON ET. AL., supra note 14, at Map 1.
196. See COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 306.
197. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
¶ 28, U.N. Doc. S/2004/814 (Oct. 13, 2004). The Report states:
While the impact of the contribution of women to informal peace pro-
cesses is well known, obstacles to their participation and to the systematic 
incorporation of gender perspectives in formal peace processes remain. 
The number of women who participate in formal peace processes remains 
small. The leadership of parties to conflict is male-dominated and men 
are chosen to participate at the peace table. The desire to bring peace at 
any cost may result in a failure to involve women and consider their 
needs and concerns.
Id. [hereinafter 2004 Report on Women and Peace and Security].
198. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
¶ 48, U.N. Doc. S/2017/861 (Oct. 16, 2017). The Report states:
I commend efforts to strengthen networks of women’s civil society organ-
izations operating in contexts of violent extremism and terrorism and to 
ensure that their perspectives feed into broader work on prevention and 
response, including that of the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership 
in support of innovative civil society-led efforts to prevent violent ex-
tremism.
Id.
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1. Russia: A Case Study
In 2000, Russia voted for UNSCR 1325,199 but has done little else 
to support the goals of the Resolution. For example, Russia has not cre-
ated a NAP to implement the goals of UNSCR 1325. Russia also has 
not made any financial commitments to WPS initiatives, unlike all oth-
er Security Council members, which have contributed at least minimal-
ly.200 In fact, in comparison with other Security Council members, Rus-
sia is rated as either the lowest or next to lowest in every category 
analyzed by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
which ranks international support for WPS initiatives.201
In addition to the lack of support shown internationally, Russia has 
also done little domestically to support the goals of UNSCR 1325. Ra-
ther, recent changes to domestic law have actually diminished the hu-
man security of women in Russia. For example, in 2017, the govern-
ment passed a law permitting a domestic violence offender to be fined 
rather than face criminal charges if he or she was a first-time offender.202
These laws are contrary to UNSCR 1325.
Another indication of the Russian government’s counterproductive 
measures towards UNSCR 1325 is its apparent lack of support and at 
times animosity for groups supporting gender equality. This is illustrat-
ed by the staggeringly small number of women’s movements dedicated 
to addressing gender inequality issues in Russia.203 The primary reason 
for this small number is government opposition to women’s initiatives 
and the propaganda the government has disseminated about these 
groups.204 In fact, the government has not just adopted a laissez faire at-
199. Country/Region Profile of: Russia, PEACE WOMEN, https://www.peacewomen.org/
profile/country-region-profile-russia (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
200. See Security Counsel WPS Scorecard, PEACE WOMEN, https://www.peacewomen.org/
scorecards [https://perma.cc/J9EL-SR7Q].
201. Id.
202. Indra Ekmanis, Russia’s Growing Feminist Movement, WEEK (June 22, 2019), 
https://theweek.com/articles/846866/russias-growing-feminist-movement
[https://perma.cc/KRV2-4KRW].
203. See Loretta Marie Perera, Russia’s Feminists Work to Smash the Taboo, MOSCOW 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/02/21/smashing-
the-taboo-a60587 [https://perma.cc/PU2M-9QGE] (interviewing activist Natalia 
Timofeyeva, who explains that “feminism is still a dirty word” in Russia).
204. Ekmanis, supra note 202 (“In a country where the concept of feminism remains at 
best socially neutral and at worst a ‘mortal sin,’ activists fighting for gender equality 
under the banner of feminism have to take success where they can get it. And it’s of-
ten fleeting.”).
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titude towards women’s movements and issues; it has engaged in active 
opposition against them.205
In 2017, Russian women, with the support of the EU Delegation 
to Russia, began organizing festivals such as “Fem Fest,” which gave 
Russian women a broad platform to air their grievances on topics such 
as Putin’s decriminalization of domestic violence and the 27% pay gap 
between Russian women and men.206 Grassroots organizers of move-
ments such as these faced political and legal consequences, while sup-
porters also lost their jobs, received fines, or were even imprisoned for 
participating.207
What little success has been accomplished Russian women have 
achieved through isolated online victories208 and through informal net-
works bringing women’s issues to the forefront.209 One such online vic-
tory came in connection to the rape case of Diana Shurygina.210 Follow-
ing her interview on a popular Russian talk show, Pust Govorvat, a 
Russian division of Burger King used her likeness in an ad, making light 
of her case to sell cheeseburgers.211 This ad led to the popularization of 
Diana memes attached to a derogatory nickname: “Shkurygina” (her last 
name combined with the contemptuous nickname for girls and women, 
“shkura”).212 A social media outcry led to the ad ultimately being taken 
down.213 Following the murder of nineteen-year-old Tatiana Strakhova 
at the hands of her ex-boyfriend in 2018 another isolated victory fol-
205. Id.
206. Daria Litvinova, Festival Tries to Reclaim Russian Feminism—But is it Radical 
Enough?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
mar/15/feminist-festival-russia-womens-rights-international-womens-day [https://
perma.cc/7T4W-T4RA].
207. Ekmanis, supra note 202 (reporting that the band Pussy Riot was detained after a 
provocative performance at Moscow’s Christ the Savior Cathedral, which was directly 
linked to feminism).
208. Amie Ferris-Rotman, Putin’s War on Women, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/putins-war-on-women/[https://perma.cc
/G3H8-EW6Z].
209. See id. For example, President Putin joked about rape recently, boasted that his coun-
try’s prostitutes are the best in the world, and has put down women for menstruating. 
Id.
210. Diana Shurygina, EVERIPEDIA, https://everipedia.org/wiki/lang_en/diana-shurygina
[https://perma.cc/3HXM-C2JU].
211. Maria Stoliarova, Burger King
, MEDIALEAKS (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://medialeaks.ru/1602mms-burger-king-ispolzoval-obraz-nesovershennoletney-
shuryiginoy-v-reklame-i-narvalsya-na-kritiku/ [https://perma.cc/R4WR-DH3Q].
212. Diana Shurygina, supra note 210.
213. Stoliarova, supra note 211.
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lowed: Hundreds of Russian women subsequently posed on social me-
dia wearing only their underwear alongside the hashtag #ThisIsNoRea-
sonToKill.214
Both of these incidents led to attention on the issues at hand, but 
were merely embryonic in their widespread momentum towards a 
#MeToo movement for women in Russia. To make matters worse, mi-
sogyny has gone increasingly unchecked since the popular rise of 
Putin.215 Just to name a few of his public displays of misogyny, the Rus-
sian leader has joked about rape at public events, has boasted that his 
country’s prostitutes are the best in the world, and has mocked women 
for menstruating.216 In 2017, while being interviewed for a documentary 
series, Putin told a filmmaker: “I am not a woman, so I don’t have bad 
days.”217 When his remarks went viral, columnist Svetlana Feoktistova 
described this as part of the broader anti-woman culture in Russia: 
“[M]en allow themselves to use insulting expressions, engage in sexual 
harassment, and make dirty jokes, thinking that it is normal and that if 
a woman is offended, she lacks a sense of humor.”218 This was happen-
ing parallel to the Harvey Weinstein cases in the United States where 
similar language to that which Feoktistova criticized was being used to 
support Weinstein.219
The prevalence of misogynistic attitudes even at the highest gov-
ernment levels coupled with the lack of government support for wom-
en’s issues through hostile laws and active oppression has resulted in 
Russian women hesitating to speak about gender equality, let alone ad-
vocate for WPS initiatives.
In summary, although Russia voted for UNSCR 1325, the Russian 
government has not implemented 1325, has enacted laws contrary to 
UNSCR 1325, and has blocked the small victories of grassroots move-
ments through intimidation and retribution tactics. Hence, despite Rus-
sian women’s successes and desire to create grassroots movements that 
promote gender equality, very little progress has been made.
214. Ferris-Rotman, supra note 208.
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Ester Bloom, Putin: ‘I Am Not a Woman, so I Don’t Have Bad Days’, CNBC: MAKE 
IT (June 6, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/putin-i-am-not-a-woman-so-
i-dont-have-bad-days.html [https://perma.cc/RRD4-HUPV].
218. Julia Glum, Sexual Harassment Does Not Happen in Russia Because of Vladimir Putin,
Pageant Queens Say, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/
vladimir-putin-sexual-harassment-harvey-weinstein-684230.
219. Ferris-Rotman, supra note 208.
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2. Northern Ireland: A Case Study
The violent conflict of Northern Ireland between Catholic and 
Protestant populations known as “the Troubles” hit its climax between 
the 1960s and the 1990s.220 The major violence came to a stop in 1998 
with the creation of the Good Friday Agreement.221 Northern Ireland’s 
male dominated and highly gendered politics left women to pursue in-
fluence through alternative paths.222 At the time the government leader-
ship viewed community development such as food provision, after-
school programs, and educational outreach as secondary to the politics 
of the conflict. While the violence of the Troubles claimed the political 
attention of the men, women began to claim community development 
projects as their own. “A formal community and voluntary sector devel-
oped out of this movement and within it a sophisticated, largely self-
taught, and professional class of women community workers.”223 In the 
1980s this community action formed into women’s centers, places that 
focused on women’s needs across Northern Ireland and within each lo-
cal community.224 As a result, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 
(“NIWC”), the grassroots movement behind much of this community 
development, gained enough political momentum to be represented at 
the Good Friday peace agreement through their elected representatives, 
Monica McWilliams and Pearl Sagar.225
The NIWC built a bridge across the two sides of the conflict dur-
ing the Troubles and focused on a higher group identity as women: 
Numbers from both sides strengthened their cross-community organiza-
tion.226 Catholic and Protestant women’s groups led by Monica 
McWilliams and May Blood joined forces during the peace talks and 
220. Joseph M. Brown & Gordon C. McCord, Northern Ireland’s Troubles Began 50 Years 
Ago. Here’s Why They Were So Violent, WASH. POST. (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/22/why-were-troubles-so-bloody-
this-helps-explain/ [https://perma.cc/B72E-SUX8].
221. The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Apr. 10, 1998, 2114 U.N.T.S. 473.
222. Valerie Morgan, Professional Lecture at the University of Ulster: Peacemakers? 
Peacekeepers?—Women in Northern Ireland 1969-1965 (Oct. 25, 1995) 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/women/paper3.htm. [https://perma.cc/4RLV-PUBJ].
223. Amanda E. Donahoe, “Wee Women’s Work:” Women and Peacebuilding in North-
ern Ireland 3 (Aug. 1, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver) 
(on file with the Digital Commons at the University of Denver).
224. Id. at 64.
225. Cera Murtagh, A Transient Transition: The Cultural and Institutional Obstacles Imped-
ing the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition in its Progression from Informal to Formal 
Politics, 23 IRISH POL. STUD. 21, 28 (2008).
226. Donahoe, supra note 223, at 90-108.
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were able to secure support from women across Northern Ireland to se-
cure votes for their female representatives.227 The NIWC achieved many 
victories in the agreement; particularly important was a separate clause 
affirming the right of full and equal political participation for women.228
Following the agreement, the media in Ireland advocated for the 
concept of “women of peace, men of war.”229 Although the title “women 
of peace” seems positive, the effect of that nomenclature actually created 
a perception of women as “passive” in the legislative arena.230 Thus, as in 
many societies recovering from internal or external conflict, the women 
of Northern Ireland had to contend with a return to traditional gender 
roles once the conflict concluded.231 Women were quickly removed 
from the peace process when men deployed social norms to shape the 
issues and designate decision makers; societal attitudes were reflected in 
phrases such as “the men will take it from here” following the agree-
ment.232
When the U.N. passed UNSCR 1325, the women of Northern 
Ireland did not benefit from the implementation due to the U.K. and 
Northern Ireland’s shared government.233 For example, the U.K. exclud-
ed Northern Ireland from its NAP.234 The lack of support eventually led 
to the dissolution of the NIWC and the leadership of the women’s 
movement in Northern Ireland.235
Without the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent 
resolutions pertaining to WPS, the progress that women had achieved in 
227. Id.
228. See Murtagh, supra note 225, at 21-40; Maria-Adriana Deiana, Women’s Citizenship
in Northern Ireland after the 1998 Agreement, 28 IRISH POL. STUD. 399, 403 (2013).
229. Carmel Roulston, Equal Opportunities for Women, in NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS
139-46 (Arthur Aughey & Duncan Morrow eds., 1996).
230. Id.
231. See Deiana, supra note 228, at 404.
232. See Jamille Bigio et. al., Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations in Northern Ire-
land Made Them Less Likely to Fail, THE HILL (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/383059-womens-participation-in-peace-
negotiations-in-northern-ireland-made [https://perma.cc/B8JX-BD8N].
233. See Melanie Hoewer, UNSCR 1325 in Northern Ireland: Opportunities, Challenges and 




235. Women’s Participation in the Peace Process Website Interactive: Northern Ireland,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-
in-peace-processes/northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/UB9M-NQ7K].
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the Good Friday agreement disappeared.236 Currently, Northern Ireland
is still fighting for women’s representation in government and peace-
building roles.237 Northern Ireland is not included in the U.K. National 
Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.238 This is due to the fact 
that although the NAP recognizes domestic strategies as complemen-
tary, its focus remains outward on conflicts the U.K. is involved in in-
ternationally.239 This means the impact of gendered violence within the 
country, such as the status of women in Northern Ireland, remain un-
addressed.240 The situation is compounded because the U.K. govern-
ment denies that there was a significant conflict in Northern Ireland and 
will therefore not apply UNSCR 1325.241 Further, there is currently no 
formal requirement, either independently under UNSCR 1325 or from 
the U.K. Government, for the Northern Ireland Executive to imple-
ment, coordinate, and report on matters concerning WPS.242
Post-agreement Northern Ireland presents a clear example that de-
spite the hopes of political and social transformation with the increase of 
women’s leadership in government, the transition to peace instead rein-
forced the traditional gender inequalities through politics.243 Ultimately, 
women were written out of the legacy of the conflict and were seen as 
bystanders instead of participants, leaving their stories and needs un-
heard once an initial agreement was reached. Without clear political 
support for women’s groups, women’s leadership during the peace pro-
cess may not last.
IV. Proposed Solutions
“The [UNSCR 1325] is arguably not binding on Member States and hence 
its upholding as a global charter of women’s rights becomes circumscribed. 
236. NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN’S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
POSITION OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE THE PEACE AGREEMENT:
SUMMARY REPORT 3–5 (2015), http://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
NIWEP-Westminster-Summary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FEF-8JB5].
237. See Deiana, supra note 228, at 404.
238. NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN’S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, supra note 236.




242. See NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN’S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, supra note 236, at 3-4.
243. Deiana, supra note 228, at 405.
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Even though Resolution 1325 is international law, it is ‘soft,’ not ‘hard.’
And this soft law can advance gender equality only in a limited fashion.”244
After decades of work trying to reorient international and domestic 
law to achieve greater gender equality in order to secure increased inter-
national peace and security, there is some success but still much room 
for improvement. The most recent WPS UNSCR is illustrative of how 
far the international community has come since the 1990s with the cre-
ation of CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 in 2000. However, critics have 
lamented the significant compromises that were made to the resolution.
In April of 2019, the Security Council continued to augment 
UNSCR 1325 by passing UNSCR 2647, which addressed the needs of 
sexual violence victims in armed conflict. Compared to previous WPS 
U.N. initiatives, UNSCR 2467 is more forceful and articulate in calling 
for action. For example, the Resolution reaffirms that Member States 
“bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights 
of all persons within their territory.”245 The Resolution also “affirm[s] 
the primary role of Member States to implement fully the relevant pro-
visions of Security Council resolutions on women, peace, and securi-
ty.”246
The Resolution’s first operative paragraph “reiterates its demand for 
the complete cessation with immediate effect by all parties to armed con-
flict of all acts of sexual violence and its call for these parties to make 
and implement specific time-bound commitments to combat sexual vio-
lence.”247 Further, in paragraph 10, the Security Council “urges existing 
Sanction Committees . . . to apply targeted sanctions against those who 
perpetrate and direct sexual violence in conflict.”248
All Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution, 
with the exception of Russia and China.249 While Resolution 2467 uti-
lized more forceful and less equivocal language, the original resolution 
was even more demanding on States. The original text established a 
Working Group of Security Council members on sexual violence in 
conflict as a formal enforcement mechanism, it “adopted language on 
244. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 9.
245. S.C. Res. 2467, ¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2019).
246. Id.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added).
249. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Adopts Resolution Calling upon 
Belligerents Worldwide to Adopt Concrete Commitments on Ending Sexual Vio-
lence in Conflict, U.N. Press Release SC/13790 (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.un.org
/press/en/2019/sc13790.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/AW2T-KSGD].
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referral of cases to the International Criminal Court, emphasized the 
vulnerability of LGBTI groups,”250 and it contained provisions express-
ing the need for comprehensive reproductive health services for survi-
vors.251 Due to reservations by the United States and others, however, 
these provisions were eliminated from the current resolution.252
Though the language of UNSCR 2467 is a step forward, it remains 
fundamentally flawed as a truly effective measure to achieve world peace 
through gender equality. First, it is mired in the situation of armed con-
flict and perpetuates the “women as victims” paradigm that fails to rec-
ognize that women have a role to play in their own right, not just as vic-
tims. More importantly, as with all the other UNSCRs and other WPS 
actions thus far, it carries no legal force. There are no mandatory, legally 
enforceable claims on Member States from this UNSCR. Indeed, the 
lack of legally binding requirements on Member States is not only the 
most significant inadequacy of this Resolution, but it is also the single 
most important failure of the WPS agenda so far.
Although the efforts to equalize gender representation in interna-
tional peace and security have been extensive, they have not yet elevated 
WPS issues to the level of importance they both deserve and require. 
The ineffectiveness of UNSCR 1325 to actually bring about real change 
has caused Shekhawat to speculate that “it raises a question related to 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the United Nations as the apex inter-
national organization.”253
The international community will continue to debate whether the 
failure of the WPS agenda to create real change is a signal of the U.N.’s 
ineffectiveness. At the very least, this failure draws attention to the inef-
fectiveness of the mechanisms the U.N., and particularly the Security 
Council, currently apply to further international peace and security 
through gender equality. This section will identify specific actions need-
ed if the international community is really going to work toward inter-
national peace and security through a meaningful commitment to gen-
250. Sara E. Davies & Jacqui True, Pitfalls, Policy, and Promise of the U.N.’s Approach to 
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253. Shekhawat, supra note 104, at 4.
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der equality. These actions include using the Security Council’s manda-
tory authority to make complying with UNSCR 1325 and the WPS 
agenda legally binding on the States. This would include: 1) requiring 
Member States to validate and strengthen grassroots organizations; 2) 
the U.N. creating a template for a NAP and mandating its domestic 
adoption by Member States; and 3) establishing basic minimum domes-
tic law guarantees with respect to women’s equality with which all 
Member States must comply.
A. Chapter VII and International Peace and Security
The most important step the U.N. can take to further international 
peace and security through gender equality is to move UNSCR 1325 
and its progeny into Chapter VII, legally binding Member States to ap-
ply these Security Council resolutions.
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations lists the purposes of 
the organization, the first of which is “[t]o maintain international peace 
and security.”254 The organization is then divided into a number of or-
gans and subsidiary organs, including a General Assembly where every 
nation sits through its representative, each having one vote;255 an Inter-
national Court of Justice made up of fifteen judges sitting for nine year 
terms that rotate through regionally associated representatives from any 
country in the General Assembly;256 and an executive body known as the 
Security Council.257 The Security Council is made up of regionally 
elected representatives from fifteen nations, five of which have perma-
nent seats—the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federa-
tion, the United Kingdom, and the United States.258 These “permanent 
five” also have a veto on non-administrative actions.259
The primary missions of these bodies are described in the Charter. 
The Security Council’s mission is stated in Article 24:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council prima-
ry responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
254. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
255. U.N. Charter arts. 9-22.
256. U.N. Charter arts. 92-96.
257. U.N. Charter arts. 23-32.
258. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
259. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
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and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.260
This delegation of authority is followed in Article 25 by a commitment 
by every Member State to abide by the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil: “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.”261
It is clear under Articles 24 and 25 that in the allocation of power 
across the different organs of the U.N., the responsibility for interna-
tional peace and security lies squarely with the Security Council and 
that the Member States have an obligation to follow its decisions.262
This language from Articles 24 and 25, including the term “decisions,”
has become a key indicator of the seriousness with which the Security 
Council takes action and also a key trigger for the other Member States 
when determining their legal obligations under the Charter.263
The Security Council carries out its responsibility for the protec-
tion of international peace and security through both peaceful, volun-
tary means and forceful, non-voluntary means. Chapter VI, comprising 
Articles 33-38, is titled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”264 and lays out a 
number of methods by which the Security Council can gather infor-
mation, investigate, and then “recommend” solutions to States to help 
resolve conflicts.265 However, none of these are binding on the Member 
States.266 It is important to note that all the actions described in Part II 
that were generated by the Security Council, including UNSCR 1325 
and subsequent UNSCRs, were taken under the authority of Chapter 
VI. As with all other Chapter VI actions, they had no binding effect on 
States.
In contrast, Chapter VII is titled “Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.” The first 
Article in this chapter, Article 39, states: “The Security Council shall de-
termine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
260. U.N. Charter art. 24 ¶ 1.
261. U.N. Charter, art. 25.
262. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 947 (8th ed. 2017).
263. Role of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peace
keeping.un.org/en/role-of-security-council [https://perma.cc/RU66-QYAD].
264. U.N. Charter arts. 33-38.
265. See id.; SHAW, supra note 262, at 935.
266. See SHAW, supra note 262, at 935.
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tain or restore international peace and security.”267 Article 39 is thus a 
trigger for the remainder of the Chapter. Once the Security Council has 
determined that there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression,” it has the power to take forceful action under the re-
maining articles of the Chapter, including requiring certain actions by 
Member States.268
Articles 41 and 42 lay out options that the Security Council can 
utilize once it has determined that there is either a breach or a risk to in-
ternational peace and security.269 These options include non-forceful 
(but mandatory) means in Article 41, such as interruption of economic 
relations and the severance of diplomatic relations.270 While not forceful, 
options implemented under Chapter VII are binding and mandatory on 
the Member States.271
If Article 41 measures have not worked or if the Security Council 
believes they “would be inadequate,”272 Article 42 authorizes the Securi-
ty Council to take “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations.”273 This authorization 
was initially to be accomplished by forces “made available” to the U.N.
by Member States that would act under U.N. command.274 These forces 
267. U.N. Charter art. 39.
268. See SHAW, supra note 262, at 936.
269. See U.N. Charters, art. 41-42.
270. U.N. Charter art. 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of com-
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Id.
271. See SHAW, supra note 262, at 936.
272. U.N. Charter art. 42, ¶ 1 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Arti-
cle 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demon-
strations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.
273. Id.
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have never been formed or used.275 Rather, the Security Council has cre-
ated a practice of “authorizing” Member States to carry specific actions 
in accordance with the decisions contained in the UNSCR.276
There is a long history of the Security Council finding a “threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” under Article 39277
and then taking action with Article 41 measures or Article 42 
measures.278 Many of the Security Council’s Chapter VII actions have 
been directly related to uses of force, such as the 1990 authorization for 
a coalition of States to expel Iraq from Kuwait.279 Others have centered 
on issues of equal treatment rather than on the use of force, such as the 
UNSCRs rejecting apartheid in South Africa.280
In every case under Chapter VII, the key threshold finding is the 
Security Council finding a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression” under Article 39.281 It is this finding that triggers not 
only the potential remedies under Chapter VII, but also triggers Mem-
ber States’ mandatory compliance with those remedies because of the 
delegation in Articles 24 and 25. To make real progress with respect to 
WPS, the Security Council must now exercise its Chapter VII authority, 
after determining in accordance with Article 39 that gender inequality 
and the mistreatment of women and girls is a threat to international 
peace and security, and require specific actions under Article 41 as will 
be discussed below.
B. Chapter VII and Women, Peace, and Security
As described earlier in this Article, the Security Council has taken 
numerous actions with respect to WPS. Starting with UNSCR 1325, a 
string of UNSCRs have articulated strong messages about the value of 
women in international peace and security and the numerous key roles 
274. U.N. Charter art. 43, ¶ 1.
275. Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,




276. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
277. U.N. Charter art. 39.
278. SHAW, supra note 262, at 946-56.
279. See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 276; S.C. Res. 661, supra note 276.
280. See S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977); S.C. Res. 569 (July 26, 1985); S.C. Res. 591 (Nov. 
28, 1986).
281. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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women can and should play.282 The U.N. more broadly has taken nu-
merous initiatives to emphasize the role of women in international peace 
and security and to encourage Member States to adopt similar 
measures.283 However, none of these Security Council actions have been 
taken under the mandatory authority of Chapter VII.
In the cases cited above, the Security Council signals its reliance on 
Chapter VII to the Member States by clearly invoking that authority in 
its resolutions. The language “Acting under Chapter VII” or similar 
words will appear in the resolution to indicate to the Member States 
that the Security Council is about to invoke its authority under Chapter 
VII and the Member States’ responsibility to comply under Articles 24 
and 25.284 States have learned to look for that language in order to know 
that the Security Council is making such an invocation.
These words have never been used in conjunction with a resolution 
on WPS. In other words, while previous resolutions have been laudable 
in content, the Security Council has yet to utilize its most important 
and effective authority to accomplish real advances in gender treat-
ment.285 It is time for that to change.
If the Security Council and the international community really be-
lieve that gender equality is the best indicator of peacefulness and that 
States will become more peaceful if they treat women equally, then the 
Security Council should make a finding under Article 39 about a threat 
to the peace: States who continue to mistreat women, making up half of 
their population, pose a threat to international peace and security. Once 
the trigger is activated, the Security Council is then able to utilize the 
rest of Chapter VII to accomplish its WPS agenda.
282. See supra Section II.C.
283. See supra Section II.A.
284. See, for example, a succession of U.N. Security Council Resolutions dealing with the 
situation in Sudan and South Sudan where the Security Council signaled its manda-
tory authority by “Acting under Chapter VII.” S.C. Res. 1591 (Mar. 29, 2005); S.C. 
Res. 1651 (Dec. 21, 2005); S.C. Res. 1665 (Dec. 4, 1961); S.C. Res. 1672 (Apr. 25, 
2006); S.C. Res. 1713 (Sept. 29, 2006); S.C. Res. 1779 (Sept. 28, 2007); S.C. Res. 
1841 (Oct. 15, 2008); S.C. Res. 1891 (Oct. 13, 2009); S.C. Res. 1945 (Oct. 14, 
2010); S.C. Res. 1982 (May 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 2035 (Feb. 17, 2012); S.C. Res. 
2091 (Feb. 14, 2013); S.C. Res. 2138 (Feb. 13, 2014); S.C. Res. 2200 (Feb. 12, 
2015); S.C. Res. 2265 (Feb. 10, 2016); S.C. Res. 2340 (Feb. 8, 2017); S.C. Res. 
2400 (Feb. 8, 2018); S.C. Res. 2455 (Feb. 7, 2019); and S.C. Res. 2508 (Feb. 11, 
2020).
285. As discussed above, Articles 24 and 25 of the U.N. Charter make their compliance 
with Chapter VII legally binding. See U.N. Charter arts. 24-25; SHAW, supra note 
262, at 947.
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The next natural step in the progression of women, peace, and se-
curity that began even before UNSCR 1325 is a UNSCR that invokes 
Chapter VII and directs Member States to take action. Utilizing its au-
thority under Article 41, subsequent to an invocation of Article 39, the 
Security Council can mandate very specific actions that every country 
would be forced to comply with or be in violation of its obligations un-
der international law. While the Security Council has previously made 
some steps forward in achieving true gender equality and reaping the 
natural benefits to international peace and security, an invocation of Ar-
ticle 39 followed by mandated measures under Article 41 is the next log-
ical and necessary step.
There would undoubtedly be opposition to such a move both 
within and outside the Security Council. As previously noted, members 
of the Security Council have not demonstrated significant support for 
the U.N. WPS agenda.286 Russia has demonstrated significant domestic 
resistance to gender equality efforts.287 China and Russia have recently 
abstained from key WPS agenda items.288 All current members of the 
Security Council struggle with various issues related to equality of gen-
der treatment.289 Asking these nations to enact a resolution committing 
themselves to a legal requirement to do better would be difficult at best.
Further, as statistics make clear, many other nations outside the Se-
curity Council have significant issues with unequal treatment of wom-
en.290 They would also presumably be concerned by a UNCSR under 
Chapter VII which would be legally binding on them and require them 
to take steps to overcome long-term and widespread gender disparities.
Despite this potential opposition, as Valerie Hudson has argued, 
“[i]t is time for the Security Council and General Assembly to hold na-
tions truly accountable for how women are treated within their borders, 
and in so doing prove that humankind finally understands that the secu-
rity of nations and the security of women are inextricably linked.”291 If 
the international community is truly committed to international peace 
286. See supra Part III.
287. See supra Part III.F.
288. S.C. Res 2493 (Oct. 29, 2019); The United Nations Security Council Unanimously 
Adopts New Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, PRIO CTR. ON GENDER, PEACE 
& SEC. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://gps.prio.org/News/Item/?x=1185 [https://perma.cc/
99HG-R2KR].
289. See Security Council WPS Scorecard, supra note 200.
290. HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 1-11.
291. Valerie M. Hudson, Sex and National Security: Insights from the Life Sciences, WORLD 
POL. REV. (Aug. 10, 2010), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6231/sex-
and-national-security-insights-from-the-life-sciences+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
[https://perma.cc/5R6Z-GMDP] [hereinafter Sex and National Security].
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and security, we believe the single most effective action it can take is to 
legally require, through UNSCR action under Chapter VII, the equal 
treatment of women.
C. Chapter VII and Specific Provisions
If the Security Council decides to treat gender equality as not only 
a matter of international peace and security, but also as one that it will 
invoke Chapter VII to remedy, there are a number of specific steps that 
the Security Council can and should take. The Security Council should, 
as a start: 1) require Member States to validate and strengthen grassroots 
organizations, 2) create a template for a NAP and mandate its domestic 
adoption by Member States, and 3) establish basic minimum domestic 
law guarantees with respect to women’s equality rights with which all 
Member States must comply.
1. Grassroots Organizations
Given the importance of work done by grassroots organizations, 
the UNSCR should direct specific support for such organizations. The 
impact grassroots organizations can have, and have had, is indisputa-
ble.292 In fact, it is only through grassroots organizations that equality of 
women’s rights can be appropriately achieved in connection with chang-
ing the cultural and other norms in each society.293
The UNSCR should explicitly identify the benefit of working 
through grassroots organizations and then direct the Secretary-General 
to ensure that a certain amount of U.N.-coordinated funding is given 
specifically and directly to grassroots organizations. This will require a 
clear definition of what constitutes a grassroots organization (such as the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition or Russia’s “Fem Fest”)294 and 
292. As stated in the U.N. Women’s 2015 Report:
To remove gender inequality in all of its forms—from gendered poverty 
and exclusion, to structural discrimination, and violations of human 
rights—peacebuilding initiatives must empower women and girls eco-
nomically, politically and socially. They must include long-term devel-
opment strategies that benefit women and girls from the grassroots, 
building their capacity for individual and collective action.
COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 169.
293. See supra Sections III.C-III.F.
294. See Murtagh, supra note 225; Litvinova, supra note 206.
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some amount of monitoring to ensure the money is going to the right 
organizations and not being siphoned off by either international or do-
mestic organizations and governments. In order to ensure uniformity 
and verifiability, the Security Council should direct the Secretary-
General to build a registration scheme for grassroots organizations that 
satisfies the definition, ensuring the organizations are truly representa-
tive of local women’s movements that are engaged in seeking equality of 
treatment within the realm of international peace and security. The Se-
curity Council may also require Member States to generate their own 
list of qualified grassroots organizations for review by the Secretary-
General. The database would become a resource for institutions who de-
sire to promote the goals of WPS by donating time, money, and exper-
tise.
Once the database is created and used to register organizations, the 
Security Council should direct the Secretary-General to create forums 
for the education and training of the registered organizations.295 The 
training should be supervised by the Secretary General and focus on les-
sons learned since the promulgation of UNSCR 1325, such as the posi-
tive impact of women when they play a role in the peace process. As the 
2015 Report advocates:
Networks of women peacebuilders and peacemakers must be 
expanded and supported to come to the fore. Their solidarity 
is essential if we are to move the world toward the original vi-
sion of the United Nations, where nations turn their ‘swords 
into plowshares’ and act with conviction to prevent wars 
through dialogue and discussion.296
The Secretary-General should also create a forum for information 
and experience sharing among grassroots organizations. This could be a 
mostly internet-based forum, but would necessarily include options for 
confidential information exchanges, including documents and media 
that would include information such as lessons learned, techniques and 
strategies, and contact information. This is an area where a “top-down”
facilitation of a “bottom-up” approach might be very useful. By creating 
295. The value of training is a consistent theme for increasing the effectiveness of grass-
roots organizations. For example, the Secretary General’s 2004 Report states, “[o]ne 
lesson learned from the peace negotiations in Liberia is that women need to receive 
early support and training in order to facilitate their active participation in the nego-
tiation of peace agreements.” 2004 Report on Women and Peace and Security, supra
note 197, ¶ 27.
296. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 16-17.
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a globally managed and protected forum where grassroots organizations 
can share ideas, experiences, and best practices, the U.N. could help fa-
cilitate real change in WPS. In support of the idea for information ex-
change, Valerie Hudson has argued, “[a]nother important state infor-
mation strategy is to educate women about their rights under state law. 
As we have noted, often there are fairly enlightened laws on the books 
whose effects never seem to translate into the real lives of women.”297
However, even the most enlightened laws are not useful if the citizens 
subject to those laws do not know how to effectively utilize them. By 
creating a forum for sharing information, the U.N. could facilitate the 
sharing of lessons learned between grassroots organizations, allowing 
them to benefit from each other’s experiences.
Noting the importance of bottom-up approaches,298 the U.N. must 
take these initiatives in a way that ensures similar actions are also im-
plemented within Member States. A top-down requirement is not nec-
essarily a top-down approach. The Security Council could require States 
to accomplish certain end results but allow a “margin of appreciation”299
in the implementation measures necessary to accomplish those ends. Fa-
cilitating an active role by State governments will hopefully build trust 
between local government and civil society.
Further, the effectiveness of this recommendation is almost com-
pletely dependent on access, much of which might be limited by non-
political factors such as cost of travel, access to consistent internet, and 
modern computer infrastructure. If a grassroots organization does not 
have access to computers that connect to the internet, even the most 
well-designed forum would provide no help. Additionally, political fac-
tors such as government censorship, restrictions on the formation of 
grassroots organizations, and limitations on registration with the U.N.
or other civil society organizations may also prevent effective participa-
tion in an otherwise beneficial forum framework. Requiring States to 
enable grassroots organizations to communicate and access information 
297. Sex and National Security, supra note 291.
298. Powell, supra note 4, at 271-72, 278, 315 (arguing for a “democratic legitimacy”
framework for WPS in part because it takes greater account of bottom-up approach-
es).
299. The European Court of Human Rights developed the “margin of appreciation” doc-
trine, which acknowledges conflicts may arise between the domestic laws of various 
states, and thus states should be granted some discretion when it comes to fulfilling 
their obligations to the European Convention on Human Rights. This doctrine has 
since been adopted and applied to other areas of international human rights law. See
Proportionality, the Margin of Appreciation and our Human Rights—in Plain English, 
EACH OTHER (Dec. 7, 2017), https://eachother.org.uk/proportionality-margin-
appreciation-human-rights-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/XM4M-WGS5].
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sources such as the forum discussed above will help limit existing re-
straints States may have installed through both law and policy.
Despite these potential issues, effective and focused Security Coun-
cil action under Chapter VII and continuing oversight of state govern-
ment actions will do much to overcome limitations, particularly those 
generated by domestic governments. Encouraging the creation and con-
tinuing political support for grassroots organizations, and then register-
ing the organizations and providing ways for such organizations to net-
work, share best practices, and cooperate would be a significant move 
forward. Ensuring the involvement of State and local governments 
through mandatory language in the UNSCR will create specific and 
pragmatic implementation of the WPS agenda.
2. National Action Plans
The Security Council should also make the establishment of NAPs 
mandatory and provide assistance in their creation and review of their 
implementation. States are not currently required to create a NAP, and 
there is very little actual review of NAP implementation.300 Acting under 
Chapter VII, the Security Council could turn the NAP into a real tool
for change and improvement.
The Security Council must first mandate the creation of a U.N.
NAP template that establishes specific areas of concern that must be ad-
dressed. This NAP template would establish the baseline requirements 
for subsequent NAPs by Member States and would contain at a mini-
mum Fritz’s seventeen points discussed above in Part II.C.1.301 This 
template would then be disseminated to Member States as the basis for 
their own NAPs. Some degree of standardization on the topics to be 
covered will help produce NAPs that share common interpretations of 
key terms and requirements, while still allowing Member States to adapt 
the NAPs for their culture and address individual State issues and con-
cerns. For example, in some NAPs, taking action to ensure women’s 
ability to create, manage, and own businesses would be more important 
than in others.
The UNSCR should mandate the involvement of women, both in 
the development of this template and in the work of Member States as 
they create their own NAPs. In line with other similar quotas such as 
300. See supra Section II.C.1.
301. Fritz, supra note 115, at 85-89.
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electoral quotas,302 ensuring women’s voices are a vital part of the NAP 
process will ensure the needs of women are addressed in a systematic 
and pragmatic way.
As Member States produce their own NAPs based on the U.N.
template, States should be required to have their NAPs reviewed by the 
Security Council or another appropriate U.N. organization to ensure 
compliance and efficacy. Beginning from an agreed U.N. template and 
then subjecting the proposed NAPs to rigorous review by the U.N. will 
encourage Member States to take the NAP formulation process serious-
ly. Once Member States’ NAPs have been reviewed and approved, the 
U.N. must continue to monitor implementation and allow the Security 
Council to take subsequent action in cases of recalcitrance.
Of course, Member States are going to resist both the required 
formulation of NAPs and review of those NAPs as impinging on their 
sovereignty.303 States may claim that the template is not culturally or po-
litically sensitive. These claims can significantly damage the potential 
impact of the requirement to produce a NAP if the template and review 
process is not sensitive to these concerns, while still enforcing the re-
quired rigor to actually bring about change. However, properly super-
vised and reviewed, NAPs can become the meaningful roadmap for im-
plementing women’s equality that they were originally designed to be. 
Requiring periodic review and updates to the domestic NAPs will also 
provide continuing, meaningful, forward movement on accomplishing 
gender equality and international peace and security.
3. Domestic Laws
The inequality of domestic laws, particularly in the areas of inher-
itance, property ownership, business, and domestic violence, is a major 
impediment to gender equality.304 As the Secretary-General’s 2015 Re-
port noted:
Without access to land, credit, tenure, skills training or in-
formation, women’s power to build peace and promote re-
covery from conflict is seriously impaired. In many fragile 
settings, women do not have access to assets, such as land, 
livestock, credit, farm implements or fishing boats and nets. 
302. See COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 50, 175.
303. See supra Section III.A.1.
304. HUDSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 54-68.
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They are instead left with what they can accomplish with 
their own hands in time not given over for caregiving. This 
has a profound impact not only on their poverty and margin-
alization but also on their ability to improve their communi-
ties and shape their future.305
Inequality that is generated by domestic law is an issue that highlights 
the tensions between the very basic tenets of human rights law and a na-
tion’s cultural and religious identity. The depth of this question is be-
yond the scope of this Article. However, what can be said here is that 
providing women equal protection under the law is key to achieving
true gender equality. It follows that the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, has the right and power to involve it-
self in a nation’s domestic laws to ensure equal protection in order to 
facilitate international peace and security.
The Security Council might accomplish this in many different 
ways. It could adopt as mandatory various recommendations of the 
Human Rights Council with respect to individual States. It could con-
duct its own more general review or commission a separate review by 
the Secretary-General or others to assess what legal paradigms would 
best support gender equality and then accept and implement recom-
mendations for domestic law standards as well as best practices. The Se-
curity Council could also incorporate the findings and recommenda-
tions of numerous commentators who have urged action in this area.
Regardless of the specific methodology by which the Security 
Council chooses to remedy domestic legal inequalities for women, tak-
ing action is a vital step in moving forward. Gender equality’s direct tie 
to international peace and security gives the Security Council the right 
to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state,”306 and the long-term benefits to world peace de-
mand that the Security Council do so.
305. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 15, at 81.
306. Article 2.7 of the United Nations Charter specifically allows the Security Council to 
intervene in otherwise domestic matters when taking measures under Chapter VII:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
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V. Conclusion
“Two decades of research have led me to conclude that the primary 
source of these demographic trends that breed insecurity is the systemic 
insecurity of the world’s women.”307
Given the statistical research correlating gender equality and inter-
national peace and security, it is time for the international community 
to take serious steps to ensure the equal treatment of women. Interna-
tional law can and must play a key role in that process. The Security 
Council provided the foundational principles with the passage of 
UNSCR 1325. However, this and subsequent actions have proven inef-
fective in actually bringing about meaningful change. It is now time to 
take the next step.
The most important next step in the process is the transition of the 
Security Council’s efforts to Chapter VII where it has mandatory au-
thority over the Member States of the United Nations. As the keeper of 
international peace and security, the Security Council is not only the 
natural actor to engage in this vital effort, but also the only one that has 
the legal responsibility and corresponding power to ensure this effort 
moves forward.
Because of the potential impact on international peace and securi-
ty, this effort is absolutely vital for the international community. As we 
mark the twentieth anniversary of UNSCR 1325, now is the time for 
the Security Council to follow these proposed steps and take meaningful 
action to secure world peace through gender equality.
307. Women and the Demography-Security Nexus, supra note 6.
